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ABSTRACT 
 
The thesis examines the Eisenhower administration’s decisions to use space for 
intelligence and military purposes. The first two chapters cover historical developments 
spanning the period from 1945 to 1952 as well as the first two years of the Eisenhower 
presidency (1953-1954). The third chapter provides a detailed analysis of U.S. space 
policies from 1955 to 1961. In particular, Chapter III takes a close look at the U.S. 
military space program as well as the prospect for space arms control. Organized 
chronologically, the thesis draws on publicly available documents, including declassified 
documents deposited at the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library in Abilene, Kansas.  
By examining significant National Security Council (NSC) documents, including 
reports and meeting notes, the thesis presents an argument that since the very beginning, 
U.S. space policy included a provision for intelligence and military applications of 
satellites as a matter of national security. Throughout the Eisenhower presidency, the 
concept of “peaceful” use of outer space, which did not preclude satellites from having 
certain military applications, was never questioned at the NSC. 
The thesis concludes that space militarization could have hardly been avoided. 
While the Eisenhower administration initiated a space arms control debate in early 1957, 
the Soviet Union gradually tied the issue of space arms control to other military issues, 
including nuclear disarmament and the elimination of military bases on foreign 
territories, which turned out entirely unacceptable to the United States. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
During the Eisenhower administration, air and space became important domains 
in which the President had to show mastery in balancing risks and embracing 
opportunities. The thesis closely examines U.S. Space policy from 1955 to 1961 with a 
particular emphasis on the military space program as well as the prospect of space arms 
control. By analyzing similarities and differences between the U.S and Soviet space 
programs as well as dissimilar national security priorities stemming from asymmetric 
strengths of forces, the thesis concludes that the militarization of outer space could have 
hardly been avoided. Furthermore, given each side’s vulnerabilities, fears, and suspicion 
during the early phase of the Cold War, neither the United States nor the Soviet Union 
could have truly offered a feasible and mutually-beneficial proposal with regard to a code 
of conduct or confidence-building measure in outer space during the Eisenhower 
presidency. 
 The first chapter focuses on historical background spanning the period of 1945-
1952, primarily looking at the Eisenhower’s view of the Soviet Union and the communist 
regime as well as some important technological developments that eventually set the 
stage for space exploration. Chapter I further examines Eisenhower’s perception of the 
security environment of the early Cold War and also his decision to run for presidency in 
1952. 
 The second chapter analyses the first two years of the Eisenhower presidency, 
which were essential in formulating a new national security policy. It also takes a look at 
specific threats and opportunities the administration faced. Finally, Chapter II provides an 
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important political and security context, within which the decision to use outer space for 
intelligence and military purposes took place in 1955. 
 Chapter III examines U.S. space policy from 1955 to 1961, including U.S. 
military space programs conducted by the Air Force and the Navy, and also the space 
arms control debate within the United Nations. It comes to a conclusion that from 1955, 
U.S. military space program as well as the concept of “peaceful” uses of outer space, 
which did not preclude satellites from having certain military applications was never 
questioned at the National Security Council (NSC). 
 The need for credible intelligence on the Soviet Union outweighed any 
prospective risks resulting from illegal “overflights.”After NSC 162/2, approved by the 
President in October 1953, the United States placed a heavy reliance on intelligence 
capabilities. The intelligence requirements outlined in NSC 162/2 were present in all 
subsequent basic security policies approved by the Eisenhower administration. President 
Eisenhower required reliable intelligence for two principal reasons: first, to continually 
adjust the U.S. military posture to provide for the most effective defense of the United 
States, and second, to help project national defense spending in advance to avoid 
excessive military expenditures stemming from long-term uncertainty. 
Although the Air Force and the Navy enjoyed a certain degree of freedom while 
pursuing U.S. space capabilities, the President retained supreme control over the launches 
of satellites with military capabilities as well as the prospective destruction of a satellite 
through NSC Actions 1956 and 2300 respectively. Ultimately, the military space program 
officially became an important part of U.S. national security policy in 1959, when 
President Eisenhower approved NSC 5906/1 in August 1959. 
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Due to different national security requirements, the early U.S. and Soviet space 
programs differed considerably. While the primary objectives of U.S. space program 
comprised the enhancement of scientific knowledge, military strength, economic 
capabilities and also political position, the Soviet Union initially devoted its space 
program to scientific research and manned exploration that would earn the Soviet 
communist regime substantial world-wide political and psychological gain. According to 
NSC documents, military considerations had little significance on the development of 
specific Soviet spacecraft. 
In the end, the arms control debate at the United Nations came to a stalemate due 
to different national security requirements. While the Soviet Union did not choose the 
same path as the United States when formulating its space policy objectives, the Soviets 
carefully calculated risks and opportunities when pursuing space arms control 
negotiations vis-à-vis the United States. Above all, the Soviets feared prospective 
inspections of their space launch vehicles, which also comprised their existing ICBM 
force. Inspections of the R-7 rocket would have provided U.S. scientists and military 
commanders with significant information, including the considerable limitations of the 
missile for large-scale military deployment. What is more, after the Soviet leadership 
decided to tie space arms control to military issues ranging from nuclear disarmament to 
the elimination of military bases on foreign territories, the space arms control debate 
virtually ended. The United States would have never given up nuclear weapons that 
formed an indispensable pillar of U.S. security strategy, nor would the Eisenhower 
administration have agreed to withdraw U.S. armed forces from foreign territories, which 
represented an integral part of the policy of containment.  
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After the end of the Eisenhower presidency, the United States and the Soviet 
Union eventually found a middle ground and the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of 
Outer Space (COPUOS) gradually became an important platform for space arms control. 
Not only did the concept of peaceful use of outer space come to fruition, but 
reconnaissance satellites ultimately paved the way for strategic arms control agreements 
and helped usher the United States and the Soviet Union into an era of détente.  
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CHAPTER I  
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
 
Dwight David Eisenhower first appeared on the international scene at a time, 
when the United States and the Soviet Union formed an alliance. The two ideological 
adversaries overcame their differences in order to fight against the Nazi regime and 
restore the balance of power on the European continent. World War II brought the USA 
and the USSR together with Eisenhower standing at the epicenter of this convenient 
relationship. As the Supreme Allied Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force, he 
had an opportunity to interact not only with allied military commanders, but also with 
high-ranking policy-makers, including the Soviet General Secretary Joseph Stalin. On 
March 25, 1945, as the allies advanced close to Berlin, Eisenhower read a note from 
Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov accusing the West of dealing “behind the backs of the 
Soviet Union,” while conducting surrender negotiations with the German military 
command in Italy.1 Eisenhower became much displeased by the Soviet charges, while 
insisting that he would accept surrenders whenever offered with no regard to political 
matters. While British Prime Minister Churchill pressed him to “make a definite effort to 
beat the Russians to Berlin,” Eisenhower thought otherwise. Advised by General Omar 
Bradley, Eisenhower knew that taking over Berlin might yield “about 100,000 
casualties.” After all, Berlin was a part of the occupation zone assigned to the Soviets at 
the Yalta Conference that had taken place in February.2 On March 28, 1945, to 
Churchill’s disappointment, Eisenhower took initiative and sent a cable directly to Stalin 
                                                          
1 Ambrose, E. Stephen. Eisenhower: Soldier, General of the Army, President-Elect 1890-1952. Simon and 
Schuster, 1983, pp. 390-391. 
2 Ibid., 393. 
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suggesting that the allied forces meet at a rally point near Dresden. Stalin initially agreed 
to link-up with the U.S. forces near Dresden, although at last minute he ordered his major 
force comprising of more than a million soldiers to capture Berlin. Consequently, the 
Soviets were the first to launch a final attack on Berlin on April 16, 1945.3 By taking into 
account Soviet concerns, Eisenhower demonstrated that despite political pressure, he 
could preserve calm judgment and make pragmatic decisions that accommodated 
interests of both sides. He believed at the time that “an alliance with the Russians was 
both possible and necessary” for the peaceful settlement in postwar Europe.4 While 
Germany surrendered on May 7, 1945, a peaceful arrangement in Europe remained 
elusive. Eisenhower became the most celebrated hero of the war. Yet by 1952, when 
running for the presidency, he “felt embarrassed by his 1945 pronouncements on the 
Soviets and by his failure to take Berlin.”5  
Shortly after the war ended, Eisenhower considered Soviet-American relations 
based on “an honest desire on both sides to strive for mutual understanding” as 
“absolutely essential to world tranquility.”6 But it was the mutual distrust rather than 
understanding that soon started to pervade U.S.-Soviet affairs. At first, however, 
Eisenhower and Stalin enjoyed an unusually fine relationship. In August 1945, 
Eisenhower accepted Stalin’s invitation and flew to Moscow. The Soviet leader honored 
Eisenhower in several ways, including by letting him stand on Lenin’s Tomb. What is 
more, Stalin apologized to Eisenhower for the actions of the Red Army in April 1945, 
when it marched towards Berlin rather than Dresden. Eisenhower noted in his diary that 
                                                          
3 Bullock, Alan. Hitler and Stalin: Parallel Lives. Alfred A. Knopf, 1992, p. 884. 
4 Ambrose, E. Stephen. Eisenhower: Soldier, General of the Army, President-Elect 1890-1952, 401. 
5 Ibid., 403. 
6 Ibid., 427. 
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“Stalin explained in detail the military reasons for the last-minute change.” After their 
meeting, both men were impressed by each other.7 The idea of a peaceful coexistence 
between the USA and the USSR seemed more and more feasible. While Eisenhower 
conversed with Stalin in Moscow, however, the United States dropped two atomic bombs 
on Japan. Although Eisenhower had opposed using the bomb in World War II, he could 
not have prevented it. Ultimately, it was “the bomb” that began to change everything. 
Immediately after the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the sense of global security 
as well as the certainty of U.S.-Soviet relations started to fall apart. 
The destructive power of nuclear fission was not the only technological 
breakthrough that figured in the Second World War. Significant advancements in the 
science of rocketry allowed the Germans to develop and deploy the first modern ballistic 
missile called the V-2. Developed by a team led by Walter Dornberger and Wernher von 
Braun, the V-2 represented a weapon, against which at the time no active defense could 
be employed. Between 1942 and 1945, Germany produced over 6,000 V-2s, of which 
more than a half were launched at allied targets, mostly in Great Britain.8 Although the 
missile lacked accuracy, which significantly impaired its battle effectiveness, its 
technology proved essential to future advances in rocketry. What is more, the V-2 was 
“the first man-made object to reach the edge of space.”9 Indeed, the German missile not 
only paved the way for next generations of ballistic missiles, but also for the rockets used 
in space exploration.  
 
                                                          
7 Ibid. 430. 
8 Van Riper, A. Bowdoin. Rockets and Missiles: The Life Story of a Technology. The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2004, p. 55. 
9 Neufeld, J. Michael. Von Braun: Dreamer of Space, Engineer of War. Alfred A. Knopf, 2007, pp. 72-73. 
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POLICY OF ACCOMODATION 
 
After Japan surrendered in August 1945 and World War II came to an end, the 
allies delved into intense negotiations concerning the future of Europe. The diplomatic 
debate over the administration of Germany as well as the role of Poland in postwar 
Europe soon pointed out to major political differences between the American and Soviet 
political visions. Stalin’s demands reflected his conviction that the Soviet people had 
carried the main burden of the war. In fact, the Soviet Union suffered many more 
casualties than the United States and the Great Britain combined. Yet the Soviet vision of 
European spheres of influence did not precisely correspond to that of the West. Initially, 
with President Truman in the White House and Secretary of State James Byrnes leading 
the U.S. foreign policy, the United States practiced the policy of accommodation based 
on carefully delineating spheres of influence, while granting security guarantees to both 
power blocks.10 By December 1945, the United States diplomatically recognized 
Communist regimes in Bulgaria and Romania. In exchange, Byrnes managed to gain the 
“Soviet acceptance of American preeminence in Japan.”11 Turkey, however, became a 
country of dispute. The Soviet Union had for a long time desired to establish a military 
presence on the Turkish Straits. At the Potsdam conference, Stalin argued that while 
America controlled the Panama Canal and Britain had the Suez Canal, the Soviets should 
also have the right to control a strategic waterway. After not meeting with success in 
Potsdam, Stalin intensified political and military pressure on Turkey. It was the Soviet 
policy in Turkey as well as in Iran, where the Soviets had prolonged their withdrawal 
                                                          
10 Trachtenberg, Marc. A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement 1945-1963. Princeton 
University Press, 1999, pp. 34-39. 
11 Ibid., 14-15. 
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deadline, which eventually put an end to the policy of accommodation. By early 1946, 
Truman wrote to Byrnes to stop “babying the Russians.”12 It was time to change the 
course of U.S. foreign policy. 
Before the Truman administration had a chance to develop a new policy 
approach, the Soviet and British leaders took the initiative by delivering influential 
speeches in Moscow and Fulton, Missouri respectively. In the February 1946 pre-election 
speech, Stalin praised Marxism as a peace preserving system. Conversely, according to 
the Soviet leader, Capitalism propelled by competition for resources inevitably led to the 
disturbance of international equilibrium and frequent “reparation of the spheres of 
influence by armed force.” Stalin also emphasized that while the postwar reparations of 
the devastated Soviet Union deserved the fullest and immediate effort of the Communist 
party, other priorities also included “extensive organization of scientific research 
institutes of every kind.”13 Interestingly, three months after the Stalin’s speech, the USSR 
Council of Ministers “issued a decree making the development of the Soviet rocket 
weapons a high national priority.”14  
Meanwhile, in March 1946, Churchill visited the United States and gave a speech 
at Westminster College in Missouri. He highlighted the value of freedom and liberty that 
the United States, Great Britain, and other English-speaking countries enjoyed. Then he 
pointed out the unpredictability of the Soviet Union with regard to its “expansive and 
proselytizing tendencies.” Most notably, Churchill introduced the term “iron curtain” as 
to depict the geopolitical split of Central and Eastern Europe into spheres of influence; 
                                                          
12 Ibid., 39. 
13 Stalin, Joseph. Pre-election Speech. February 9, 1946.  
14 Gruntman, Mike. Blazing the Trail: The Early History of Spacecraft and Rocketry. American Institute of 
Aeronautics and Astronautics, 2004, pp. 275-277.  
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the Soviets, according to Churchill, not only influenced foreign governments within their 
spheres, but also controlled them. He went on by indirectly regretting a too favorable 
outcome for the Soviet Union at Yalta conference, although admitting that at the time, 
where there were still many unknowns, the agreement seemed sound.15 Prior to giving 
the speech, Churchill showed the draft to Secretary Byrnes, who responded favorably. 
Churchill wrote to Prime Minister Atlee afterward that there was “no doubt” that the top 
American policy-makers were “deeply distressed by the way they are being treated by 
Russia.”16 Towards the end of 1946, Byrnes himself started to lean towards adopting a 
tougher line on the Soviets. One of the reasons for the change was George Kennan’s 
“Long Telegram” that had been cabled to Byrnes from the U.S. Embassy in Moscow a 
few weeks before Churchill’s visit. By analyzing historical and ideological context 
underlying the irreconcilable differences between the Soviet Union and the West, Kennan 
recommended that the United States reinvigorate principles of free society and fight 
communism with “courage and self-confidence.” He also asserted that the two political 
entities could not permanently coexist and suggested that the U.S. government must study 
and recognize the nature of the Communist movement with utmost “detachment and 
objectivity.”17 One year later, Kennan published an anonymous journal article in Foreign 
Affairs that among other things for the first time introduced the term containment. Indeed, 
by early 1947, James Byrnes resigned from the post of Secretary of State and the Truman 
administration put an end to the policy of accommodation. 
 Looking at international affairs from the desk of the Army Chief of Staff, 
Eisenhower dealt with issues ranging from armed forces mobilization to defining the role 
                                                          
15 Churchill, Winston. Sinews of Peace Speech. March 5, 1946. 
16 Trachtenberg, Marc. A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement 1945-1963, 40. 
17 Kennan, George. Long Telegram. February 22, 1946. 
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of the atomic bomb within the U.S. defense establishment as well as in global strategic 
affairs. In 1946, public and political debate in America started to hint upon the idea of an 
inevitable conflict between the USA and the USSR. Eisenhower, however, called such 
war scares “foolish” and “vicious.”18 Yet even President Truman had changed his mind 
about the Soviet intentions since the Potsdam conference, when the U.S.-Soviet relations 
enjoyed a relative harmony. When he called for a White House conference to discuss the 
possibility of an imminent Soviet offensive in Europe, Eisenhower felt there was no 
reason for such considerations. In reply to Truman, he said he did not believe the Soviets 
wanted a war. Eisenhower demanded “hard evidence” that such a scenario was indeed 
realistic. At about the same time, an intelligence report produced by the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation (FBI) warned of a suspicious behavior of the Soviet government, which 
had ordered all of its ships in U.S. ports “to be loaded immediately and clear the ports of 
the United States as quickly as possible.”19 The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) 
consequently discussed the possibility of an imminent war with the Soviet Union. In a 
private letter, Eisenhower confessed that he was disturbed by “the readiness of people to 
discuss war as a means of advancing peace.” Instead, he had high hopes for the 
establishment of an international peace-keeping force under the United Nations (UN) that 
would play a vital role in maintaining global peace and stability. Eisenhower even 
assigned one of his most skilled officers, General Matthew Ridgway, for such a 
prospective international force.20 For such a security arrangement to function properly, 
according to Eisenhower, the Soviet Union would have to agree to an inspection system. 
Indeed, the idea of on-site military inspections within the Soviet Union continued to 
                                                          
18 Ambrose, E. Stephen. Eisenhower: Soldier, General of the Army, President-Elect 1890-1952, 448. 
19 Ibid., 449. 
20 Ibid., 450. 
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occupy a major place within later Eisenhower’s political and military considerations.  In 
May 1946, the Chief of Staff visited General MacArthur in Tokyo. It was here, where 
MacArthur told Eisenhower he should run for the presidency. Eisenhower responded, 
however, that MacArthur instead should run for the presidency. The two men eventually 
enjoyed a lengthy evening in the Japanese capital trying to persuade one another to 
become a candidate.21 
Year 1946 also brought about an ambitious initiative in the arms control domain. 
The U.S. government came up with the so-called Baruch Plan that proposed the UN 
control of atomic energy under the condition that none of the United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC) members would be able to veto the potential use of nuclear weapons if 
the majority of the members approve of such a decision. The Soviets demanded that the 
United States get rid of its nuclear stockpile first as a prerequisite for international 
disarmament negotiations. The proposal also included a requirement for on-site 
inspections, to which the Soviets strongly objected in principle. Yet while giving control 
over fissionable material to the UN, the prospective Baruch Plan implementation would 
have retained the U.S. monopoly of nuclear weapons. Soviet Ambassador to the United 
States Andrei Gromyko countered the U.S. proposal with a demand that all existing 
nuclear weapons must be destroyed as well as the further manufacture and use of nuclear 
weapons must be internationally prohibited.22 Naturally, such an agreement would have 
harmed U.S. security interests while offering no credible gain, since the ban on the 
production of nuclear weapons would likely be violated in the long-term. After all, 
neither side offered a constructive, feasible, and equitable proposal, a phenomenon that 
                                                          
21 Ibid., 441-442. 
22 McDougall, A. Walter. The Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age. Basic Books, 
1985, pp. 84-86. 
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would pervade throughout the early years of the Cold War. While the Western powers 
enjoyed majority in the UNSC and the United States would have not abandoned its 
monopoly on nuclear weapons at the time of the proposal, the Baruch Plan eventually 
failed to come to fruition.  
Meanwhile, the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff for Research and Development 
Curtis LeMay tasked the Douglas Aircraft Company to assess the feasibility of space 
operations. On May 2, 1946, the Douglas Aircraft Company’s Engineering Division 
produced its classified analysis. The report entitled Preliminary Design of an 
Experimental World-Circling Spaceship concluded that “modern technology has 
advanced to a point where it now appears feasible to undertake the design of a satellite 
vehicle.”23 The study built on the knowledge of rocketry acquired from the German V-2 
missile and for the first time presented a practical outline for the use of space in pursuit of 
national interests by estimating the value of both civilian and military applications of 
satellites. The report also looked into specific military uses of satellites such as 
“reconnaissance, weather observation, communications relay, missile guidance, bomb 
impact spotting.”24 In addition, the satellites could also be used as a weapon; the report 
stated that “after observation of its trajectory, a control impulse can be applied in such 
direction, amount, and at such a time, that the satellite is brought down on its target.”25 In 
1948, the Douglas Aircraft Company’s Project RAND (Research and Development) 
separated from the company and formed an independent, non-profit organization, whose 
                                                          
23 Douglas Aircraft Company. Preliminary Design of an Experimental World-Circling Spaceship (SM-
11827). Douglas Aircraft Company’s Engineering Division, 1946,  
24 Preston, Bob et al. Space Weapons Earth Wars. RAND Corporation, 2002, p. 7. 
25 Douglas Aircraft Company. Preliminary Design of an Experimental World-Circling Spaceship. 
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research analyses would play an increasingly influential role on the U.S. space policies 
during the upcoming Eisenhower administration.  
 
TRUMAN DOCTRINE AND MARSHALL PLAN 
 
In 1947, President Truman set to work on his new foreign policy approach. In 
March, he delivered a speech that signified a major change in the U.S. attitude towards 
the Soviet behavior. Although the Soviet forces had meanwhile withdrawn from Iran, the 
Soviet leadership continued to exert a considerable pressure on Turkey. In the speech 
addressed to the U.S. Congress, Truman publicly pronounced that Greece and Turkey 
must not yield to the Soviet pressure that violated the Yalta declaration and 
recommended the Congress to provide economic and material aid to these countries.26 
The declaration signed by Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin in February 1945 clearly 
stated that political instability of liberated states in Europe should be “solved by 
democratic means.”27 But as Secretary Byrnes, who had accompanied Roosevelt in Yalta, 
later revealed, the Declaration on Liberated Europe “had not to be taken at face value,” 
although in public, he had claimed that the document marked the end of spheres of 
influence. Truman, however, had not been privy to the backstage of the Yalta 
negotiations and, as many policy-makers in Washington, he perceived the Declaration as 
a definite, binding agreement.28 In January 1947, Byrnes was replaced as the Secretary of 
State by General George Marshall, who aligned with Truman’s doctrine and the policy of 
containment. Yet Stalin’s view and interpretation of the Yalta declaration quite differed 
                                                          
26 Truman, S. Harry. Speech before a Joint Session of the U.S. Congress. March 12, 1947. 
27 Yalta Declaration. Declaration on Liberated Europe. February, 1945. 
28 Trachtenberg, Marc. A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement 1945-1963, 7-12. 
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from that of the U.S. administration. He believed that the immense Soviet casualties and 
“sacrifices” of World War II justified the Soviet Union’s effort to establish friendly and 
loyal governments in the states vital to the Soviet security. Stalin stressed that these 
efforts were peaceful in nature and should not be interpreted as ‘expansionist tendencies’; 
however, he did not specify, at what point such efforts would cease.29 While the Soviets 
deliberately aspired to achieve a military presence on the Turkish Strait, Truman’s speech 
was of significant importance as it sent out a clear message to the Soviet leadership that 
Turkey and Greece would indeed become a part of the U.S. sphere of influence. 
Meanwhile, Eisenhower received several notes from both ordinary and influential 
people as well as groups suggesting that he becomes a Presidential candidate. He usually 
responded with a note, in which he explained that his citizen duty and predilection for 
bipartisan work in the Pentagon greatly outweighed his interest in politics.30 Even 
President Truman called Eisenhower into the White House and asked him if “would 
accept the Democratic nomination;” however, Eisenhower turned his offer down. Not 
only did Eisenhower not show any active interest in politics, but he also kept his party 
affiliation strictly to himself.31 Similarly to President Truman, beginning in 1947, 
Eisenhower increasingly inclined towards a hard-line policy in U.S-Soviet affairs. In 
September, Eisenhower wrote in his diary that “Russia is definitely out to communize the 
world” and that the United States and the Soviet Union “face a battle to extinction 
between the two systems.” This diary entry marked a complete turnaround in 
Eisenhower’s attitude towards the Soviet Union. He was greatly disappointed about the 
                                                          
29 Stalin, Joseph. Interview with Pravda Correspondent. Pravda, March 14, 1946. 
Daniels, V. Robert. A Documentary History of Communism and the World. University Press of New 
England, 1994, pp. 103-105.  
30 Ambrose, E. Stephen. Eisenhower: Soldier, General of the Army, President-Elect 1890-1952, 459. 
31 Ibid., 460. 
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Soviet behavior in Greece, Turkey, and Iran, and gravely concerned about the future 
course of the Soviet foreign policy. Eisenhower came to the same conclusion as Kennan 
in his 1947 piece, agreeing that the “health of American democracy” and “unity is more 
necessary now than it was in Overlord.” What is more, Eisenhower hoped that American 
effort could eventually “win over” the countries that had already been taken by the Soviet 
Union.32 
During the same year, The U.S. defense and security establishment underwent a 
thorough and comprehensive reform initiated by the National Security Act of 1947. The 
act signed by President Truman entered into force on September 19, 1947 and created 
several new organizations, including the Department of Defense headed by the Secretary 
of Defense, who now directed three separate military departments: the Army, the Navy, 
and for the first time also an independent Air Force that took over the former role of the 
Army Air Forces. In addition, the law created the National Security Council (NSC) and 
also the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the first U.S. permanent peacetime 
intelligence agency. On September 26, 1947, the NSC met in its first session.33 In the 
context of the emerging Cold War, the National Security Act of 1947 proved as an 
essential reorganization effort. The NSC headed by the President would play an 
increasingly important role in initiating and coordinating U.S. foreign and security policy. 
By the time Eisenhower became the President, the NSC in his words represented “the 
most important weekly meeting of the government.”34  
                                                          
32 Ibid., 468-469. 
33 U.S. Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States 1945-1950, Emergence of the 
Intelligence Establishment: The National Security Act of 1947. U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996.  
34 Helgerson, John. Truman and Eisenhower: Launching the Process. Central Intelligence Agency’s Center 
for the Study of Intelligence, 1996. 
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Although Secretary Marshall shared basic political views with President Truman, 
he disliked his doctrine’s ideological tone and pressed forward with a more pragmatic 
approach in dealing with the Soviet expansive policy. In April 1947, at a foreign 
ministers’ conference in Moscow, Marshall found the Soviets very uncooperative and 
criticized Soviet leadership for not answering U.S. communications.35 Because of mutual 
distrust, the allies found themselves unable to reach a political compromise on the future 
of Germany. Marshall firmly believed that the United States should take the initiative in 
solving the stalemate situation. It also appeared clear that an economically deteriorated 
Germany would be increasingly susceptible to fall to a Communist rule. The unsuccessful 
Moscow conference provided a strong impetus for a U.S. economy recovery program in 
Germany and other Western European countries. In August 1947, Charles Bohlen, one of 
Marshall’s advisers, suggested that the “three Western zones in Germany should not be 
regarded as a part of Germany, but as part of Western Europe.” Bohlen’s comment 
initiated a historically significant shift in the U.S. policy within the context of the early 
Cold War. While Marshall originally wanted the Soviets to participate in the German 
economic recovery, his advisers suggested otherwise. Indeed, the plan would offer the 
Soviets very little aid and would certainly interfere with the Soviet sphere of influence in 
Eastern Europe.36 Eventually, when the United States announced the program officially 
called the European Recovery Program (ERP), the Soviets chose not to participate. The 
United States, Great Britain, and France started to organize into a unified political block. 
By the end of 1947, Europe finally stood divided into Western and Eastern spheres of 
influence. In September 1947, Stalin finally agreed with the 1946 Churchill’s speech that 
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the world was divided into two camps.37 Bedell Smith, the U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet 
Union, noted that since the Soviets “declared war on European recovery,” the Western 
powers did not really want to deal with the Soviets on the issue of German unification 
anymore.38 Through the implementation of the Truman doctrine and the ERP, the East-
West split ultimately solidified. By the end of 1947, The United States definitely rejected 
the early policy of accommodation and followed the more assertive policy of 
containment. 
 
EARLY YEARS OF THE COLD WAR: 1948-1950 
 
 By early 1948, the Soviets suspected that the West intended to turn its 
occupational zones in Germany into a German state. In a response to the Western 
conduct, in June, the Soviets decided to cut off ground access to Berlin. While the Soviets 
enjoyed conventional force superiority over the Western bloc, the United States had a 
nuclear monopoly that held back the crisis from a possible escalation into an armed 
conflict. The United States, Great Britain, and France united in an increasingly resilient 
political alliance that strived to implement “Western strategy” in Germany.39 Only an 
economically sound Germany aligned with the West could hold the Soviets at bay. The 
domestic political debate in France proved most energetic among those of Western 
powers, particularly because of historically positive Franco-Russian relations. Yet even 
the French leadership now stood on the other side. Furthermore, the French demanded 
security guarantees in a fear that the United States would eventually withdraw its forces 
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from Germany and called for a long-term military-political plan. The Soviets, in protest 
to Western policies, continued to block West Berlin. The Western allies responded with 
an airlift that supplied West Berlin until May 1949. The Berlin crisis represented the first 
major clash between the two blocks during the Cold War, while neither side was willing 
to initiate an armed confrontation; for instance, the Soviets chose not to interfere with 
airlift operations, not even by nonviolent means such as radar jamming.40  In another 
theater, the United States likewise did not interfere with the Soviet Communist coup in 
Czechoslovakia in 1948. For the first time in a major crisis of potentially global 
proportions, nuclear deterrence seemed to work well. Whereas none of the European 
allies truly reconciled with the possibility of even a limited nuclear air campaign in 
Europe precipitated by a possible conflict with the Soviet Union, the West continued to 
strive for a more pragmatic as well as prospectively more stable solution. The Western 
security system ultimately took the form of a collective security alliance. On April 4, 
1949, ten Western European countries, the United States, and Canada signed the 
Washington Treaty that established the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). 
Four months later, the United States lost its nuclear monopoly as the Soviet Union 
detonated its first nuclear device in August 1949. The uncertainty over the future of 
nuclear deterrence immediately commenced the true arms race between the East and 
West. 
 In February 1948, Eisenhower retired from active duty in the Army. By the time 
he handed over the position of Chief of Staff to General Omar Bradley, Eisenhower was 
frustrated. Until mid-1947, he had hoped for a cooperative relationship with the Soviets. 
Those expectations did not come to fruition. Quite the contrary, by early 1948, U.S.-
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Soviet relations had reached their nadir. Eisenhower decided take some time for 
reflection and started to write his memoirs. Gathering together various documents, 
including “wartime letters, reports, diary entries, and other documents,” Eisenhower 
began writing Crusade in Europe.41 Published in November 1948, the book received 
almost universal acclaim. Despite Eisenhower’s increasing public reputation, he 
remained adamant in refusing to run as a Presidential candidate of either party.42 
Meanwhile, in October 1948, Eisenhower became the thirteenth President of Columbia 
University, the position he would hold for the next two years until accepting the position 
of Commander of NATO forces in Europe in December 1950. 
 In the realm of space affairs, the year 1948 brought about several interesting 
developments. The newly established Department of Defense started for the first time to 
publicly discuss the issue of space exploration. Whereas the military services had an 
interest in space for several years already, the U.S. public remained uninformed of the 
sensitive debate. The existence of the influential Douglas Aircraft Company’s report from 
1946, Preliminary Design of an Experimental World-Circling Spaceship, was first 
disclosed to the public in the first annual report of the Secretary of Defense, James 
Forrestal, in 1948. Although the public as well as some Department of Defense officials 
remained skeptical regarding the technological feasibility of launching satellites, the 
annual report quickly provoked responses from American journalists, who wrote pieces 
such as “Will America possess moons of war?”43 Meanwhile, the Navy and the Air Force 
engaged in an inter-service rivalry campaigning for their future role in space. In January 
1948, General Hoyt Vandenberg, the Air Force Chief of Staff, declared that the Air Force 
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sought no less than “exclusive rights in space,” seeing as it had already been in charge of 
strategic air weapons.44 Facing the budget cuts of 1948, the Navy eventually reallocated 
its funding for satellite research to “more pressing projects,” while the Air Force assigned 
RAND to continue studying space satellites.45 Meanwhile, all of the three U.S. military 
services were involved in missile-related projects. Interestingly, the Navy devoted more 
funds to missile projects than the other services in the period from 1945 to 1950.46  
 With the loss of the U.S. nuclear monopoly in August 1949, the newly established 
North-Atlantic alliance started to ponder over the prospect of lasting stability on the 
European continent. The uncertainty over the use of nuclear weapons in a potential 
confrontation drove both sides to gain an advantage in the nuclear domain. Furthermore, 
it now made ever-increasing sense to consider preventive and preemptive strikes targeted 
at the adversary’s nuclear capabilities, such as air bases and aircraft production 
facilities.47 Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union could confidently claim an 
edge in a potential war. In 1950, Chairman of the JCS, Omar Bradley, told the NSC that 
if a global ware broke out, the United States “might be in danger of losing.”48 Various 
U.S. intelligence reports indicated that the Soviet Union had intensified its industrial 
production and increased its armed forces readiness. Yet the conflict broke out in quite a 
different theater. The North Korean attack on South Korea on June 25, 1950 caught 
everyone by surprise. America and other NATO member states reacted with a significant 
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increase in their defense spending; the United States almost doubled its defense spending 
from 1950 to 1951.49  
A few months before the North Korean invasion, the NSC issued NSC-68, a key 
policy document that evaluated forthcoming U.S. and Soviet military capabilities with a 
particular emphasis on nuclear weapons. The report concluded that within four years, the 
Soviet Union would achieve a thermonuclear bomb capability and pose an increasing 
threat to U.S. security. NSC-68 recommended that the United States strengthen its 
deterrent as to withstand a potential surprise strike from the Soviet Union by the period of 
1954-1955, since such a war scenario could not be ruled out with absolute certainty. 
Furthermore, the report recommended that the United States fully embrace a policy of 
containment by “encouraging and promoting the gradual retraction of undue Russian 
power and influence from the present perimeter areas around traditional Russian 
boundaries and the emergence of the satellite countries as entities independent of the 
USSR.”50 NSC-68 was approved as national policy by President Truman in September, 
1950.51  
While the war broke out on the Korean peninsula, Germany became ever-more 
important as the allies understood that in case of a conflict in Europe, NATO forces 
would have to fight on German territory. Yet when the U.S. JCS suggested that the 
current demilitarization in West Germany should be given another thought as to allow 
Germany integrate into the NATO defensive structure, President Truman dismissed such 
statements as “decidedly militaristic.”52 Whereas Truman’s resistance gradually declined, 
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the allies became more and more convinced about the importance of Germany’s 
integration into Western defensive structures. The unified NATO force in Europe needed 
a supreme commander. This position would be offered to no one else than Dwight D. 
Eisenhower. In October 1950, President Truman called Eisenhower to the White House, 
where he asked him to accept the appointment. Eisenhower did not hesitate and agreed by 
saying: “I am a soldier and am ready to respond to whatever orders my superiors may 
care to issue to me.”53 Eisenhower assumed the post of the NATO Supreme Allied 
Commander, Europe (SACEUR) on December 16, 1950. On January 1, 1951, 
Eisenhower returned to Europe. One of the most pressing tasks sitting on his table was 
persuading European partners that Germans were not European adversaries, but allies, 
whose armed forces would be prospectively essential to drive back the Red Army, and 
that the German rearmament would in spite of historical concerns prove of a long-term 
benefit to the transatlantic community.   
 In 1950, as the U.S. Air Force requested earlier, RAND Corporation produced 
another study on space satellites. The report entitled The Satellite Rocket Vehicle: 
Political and Psychological Problems delved into political and military implications of 
earth satellites and implicitly stated that the eventual American space program would be 
much more suitable to national strategic needs than that of the Soviets, mainly because 
the Soviets could “with ease find out information about United States targets in other 
ways.”54 Further, the report dealt with the sensitive public and political nature of 
launching satellites, given that the launches themselves could not be kept secret. The 
issue of establishing freedom of space within an unstable security environment deserved 
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particular attention. RAND pointed out the enormous benefits of U.S. satellite 
reconnaissance, especially “as long as the Soviet Union remained a closed society,” and 
recommended that the objective of the United States should lie in “reducing the 
effectiveness of any Soviet counteraction that might interfere with the satellite 
reconnaissance operation before significant intelligence results are secured.” By pursuing 
such a course of action, RAND suggested that the first satellite should be solely 
experimental in nature and launched into the “equatorial orbit” as not to cross Soviet 
territory.55 This recommendation indeed came true eight years later, when the United 
States successfully launched its first satellite. Although not launched into equatorial orbit, 
the first American satellite launched on January 31, 1958, under the codename Explorer 
I, carried exclusively scientific instrumentation to study cosmic rays, micrometeorites, 
and the satellite’s temperature.56 
 
EISENHOWER AND NATO 
 
 When Eisenhower assumed the post of NATO SACEUR, the United States was 
waging war on the Korean peninsula. Although the U.S. involvement in Korea was 
carried out under the mandate of the UN rather than NATO, Eisenhower became more 
and more worried about the threat of international Communism to global stability. His 
return to Europe gained front-page coverage around the world. At the epicenter of global 
security events, Eisenhower approached his work with utmost importance; on one 
occasion, he stated that the fight against the Red Army and Communism represented the 
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“last remaining chance for the survival of Western civilization.”57 He had a very good 
understanding of the importance of German rearmament for the stability and balance of 
power in the European theater. Yet Germany was not a member of NATO and some 
Western European states that were still recovering from the German occupation were not 
keen on the idea of revitalizing the German war machinery. Eisenhower faced a very 
difficult task of convincing NATO allies that a strong Germany would be of a long-term 
benefit to the entire Alliance. While the European situation came into a political 
stalemate, the military developments in Korea provided a strong impulse to act. By the 
end of 1950, the Chinese assembled their armed forces by the Yalu River and launched a 
massive counteroffensive against the UN front. The Chinese intervention ultimately 
initiated “the longest unbroken retreat in American military history” that ended on 
January 1951.58 At the time, many politicians and generals, including the Chairman of the 
JCS General Bradley, feared that the Soviet leadership might take advantage of the 
dismal U.S. situation and make a hasty attack on Western Europe. Eisenhower was well 
aware of the precarious security situation, and from this point onwards, he considered the 
strengthening of NATO forces in Europe a top priority. What is more, around this time, 
Eisenhower started to reconsider running for the presidency. It was the domestic politics 
in the United States that prompted him to think over the Presidential candidacy he had 
previously resolutely declined. At first, Eisenhower had high hopes that the Republican 
party would nominate a strong candidate for the 1952 Presidential election, who would 
press forward with a pledge of support to reinforcing Western Europe, including 
Germany. Paradoxically, the most likely Republican candidate, Senator Robert Taft, 
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proved not to support strengthening of the transatlantic security community by sending 
additional troops to Europe. When Eisenhower met with Taft before going to Europe, the 
Senator from Ohio showed no support for the concept of NATO as an essential security 
arrangement of the West. After the meeting, Eisenhower felt disheartened; yet for now, 
he retained “an aura of mystery” about his future political plans.59 Meanwhile, he 
attended top policy meetings and delivered speeches both in the United States and Europe 
to gather support for invigorating American and European security through strengthening 
NATO. 
  Eisenhower’s efforts soon bore fruit. By mid-1951, NATO began to take the 
shape of a sound military force thanks to the Congressional approval of the Mutual 
Security Act of 1951 as well as the dispatch of four divisions with supporting naval 
forces and air wings to Europe.60 Around this time, Eisenhower also developed his 
concern for defense spending and signaled his future political preference for fiscal 
conservatism. He believed that continued deficit spending would bankrupt the United 
States and feared excessive spending and inflation “as much as he feared the Russians.” 
In January 1952, Eisenhower entered the first Republican primary in New Hampshire, 
which he eventually won in March, beating Taft as well as Harold Stassen.61 Later that 
month, President Truman announced that he would not run for reelection.62 After 
subsequent victories in other states, Eisenhower devoted much of his time to the 
preparations for the Party nomination, seeking advice from experts in various aspects of 
public policy. In April, he delivered his last NATO report and asked Truman to relieve 
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him from the assignment effective June 1. From July 7 to July 12, the Republican Party 
held the Republican National Convention in Chicago. Eisenhower won the nomination. 
On the other side of the political spectrum, the Democrats nominated Adlai Stevenson. In 
mid-August, President Truman invited both candidates to the White House to offer them 
weekly intelligence briefings on the situation abroad. Truman, convinced that the 
American President occupied the most important position in the history of the world, 
considered providing both candidates with privileged information essential to the 
successful transition of U.S. leadership.63 Eisenhower, a recipient of Ultra decrypts 
during World War II, had a sound understanding of the value of intelligence. Yet he 
declined Truman’s proposal adding that Presidential candidates should only receive 
“communications known to all the American people.”64 Eisenhower said that “no grave 
emergency” existed at a time that would require him to receive classified information.65 
The national Presidential elections were held on November 4, 1952. Eisenhower beat 
Stevenson 55.1 percent to 44.4 percent in popular votes and 442 to 89 in electoral votes.66 
As a result, President-Elect Eisenhower effectively ended the Democratic streak of five 
consecutive Presidential victories. Eisenhower was sworn in as the thirty-fourth President 
of the United States on January 20, 1953. 
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CHAPTER II  
FIRST TWO YEARS OF THE EISENHOWER PRESIDENCY 
 
 Shortly after assuming office in the White House on January 20, 1953, President 
Eisenhower delivered his first inaugural address. Throughout the speech, Eisenhower 
used religious metaphors depicting the struggle for peace and freedom as a test of faith in 
the “deathless dignity of man” and the “inalienable rights” bestowed by “the Creator.” 
While only marginally touching on explicit security issues such as the threat of a nuclear 
war, the President made clear that every American citizen would play an important role 
in the “winning of the peace.”67 Waging the Cold War necessitated the involvement of 
entire nations and indeed required the public to participate. Therefore, the Eisenhower 
administration placed a considerable importance on public diplomacy as well as domestic 
and foreign psychological campaigns that would help the administration to advance 
national security objectives. On his seventh day in the office, Eisenhower created a nine-
man board to study the “problem of unifying United States psychological warfare.”68 The 
President firmly believed that in order to win hearts and minds of the people in America 
and abroad, the administration needed to pay particular attention to psychological factors 
that shaped public opinion and consequently pursue broad policies as well as specific 
operations aimed at altering the morale and confidence of the general public.69 Operation 
Candor, initiated in May, 1953, represented one of such information campaigns that 
strived to strengthen morale and raise awareness within the American public of the 
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dangers of communism as well as the threat of nuclear weapons.70 Psychological warfare 
and information campaigns formed one of the three major security pillars on which 
Eisenhower founded his Cold War strategy. The other two security priorities rested on a 
strong national defense based chiefly, although not solely, on nuclear weapons and a 
sound U.S. economy, which continually received high priority within the Eisenhower’s 
policy of fiscal conservatism.  
 Following the Truman presidency, Eisenhower inherited an increasingly complex 
intelligence community that would play a vital role in all aspects of the national security 
policy. Yet the U.S. intelligence capabilities in the early years of the Eisenhower 
administration failed to meet Presidential expectations. Due to the conflict on the Korean 
Peninsula in the early 1950s and the resulting increase in U.S. defense spending, the 
Truman administration called on the CIA headed by Bedell Smith to expand its 
clandestine services and provide more definitive intelligence on the Soviet bloc and 
People’s Republic of China.71 By the time Eisenhower became the prime recipient of 
national intelligence, the NSC report issued in February 1953 observed that the 
intelligence community still could not provide satisfactory intelligence, particularly a 
timely and adequate warning of an attack “prior to actual detection of hostile 
formations.”72 Shortly after the NSC issued its assessment, Eisenhower asked Smith to 
resign from the post of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and appointed Allen 
Dulles as the new DCI. This leadership change likely occurred for two reasons; not only 
did Eisenhower believe in the exceptional intelligence experience of Allen Dulles, who 
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had proved himself as an Office of Strategic Services (OSS) operative during World War 
II and whose brother served as Eisenhower’s Secretary of State, but Eisenhower also 
wanted someone more enthusiastic for covert actions. Certainly, covert actions early on 
became an important part of Eisenhower’s Cold War strategy.73 Shortly after Dulles 
assumed the post of DCI, he yet again admitted that the U.S. intelligence capabilities with 
regard to the Soviet Union suffered “shortcomings of serious nature.” During his first two 
years in the CIA, Dulles supported Eisenhower’s inclination for covert actions, but also 
continued to look for alternative means to collect intelligence within the borders of the 
Soviet Union. Besides an interest in covert actions, Eisenhower also particularly liked 
Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), which he learned to appreciate during World War II as a 
recipient of Ultra decrypts produced by British intelligence.74 Two months before 
Eisenhower became the President, the United States established the National Security 
Agency (NSA), the first U.S. permanent peacetime SIGINT agency. Even though the 
U.S. intelligence community represented a growing and dynamic organization, both the 
CIA and NSA failed to recognize the declining health of Joseph Stalin that led to his 
death in March, 1953. Eisenhower’s initial frustration somewhat alleviated when NSA 
started to provide him with valuable decrypts of diplomatic cables “concerning the 
reactions of Western leaders and a number of foreign communist party chiefs to the death 
of Stalin.75 
 Stalin’s death represented the first major foreign affairs challenge for the 
Eisenhower administration. Charles Douglas Jackson, whom the President appointed to 
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serve as Special Assistant for handling Cold War operations with a particular emphasis 
on psychological warfare, suggested the United States seize the moment of Soviet 
weakness and launch an aggressive propaganda campaign against the communists. 
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, on the contrary, recommended that America 
exercise caution, although he believed that Soviet “unremitting hostility” against the 
West as well as the Soviet position towards the stalemate situation in Korea would not 
lose on intensity.76 Eisenhower considered both ideas valuable; however, he demanded 
more intelligence before making a specific decision on the future course of U.S. foreign 
policy. Within a week, the CIA produced a classified report for the President informing 
him of probable consequences of Stalin’s death and on the transfer procedure of the 
Soviet leadership.77 Although the report made statements only with considerable 
uncertainty, it concluded that the Soviet Union lost the “man, who had been built up to 
the status of a demi-god,” and that the new regime will take some time to consolidate. In 
addition, the report stated that the Soviets will exercise foreign policy with utmost 
caution and suspicion during the existing critical period of relative vulnerability. Both 
Jackson and Dulles reacted to the report with critical remarks. In spite of objections from 
both of his close advisers, Eisenhower eventually decided to craft his response to the 
newly-emerging security situation on his own. The President tasked Jackson to develop a 
new “psychological plan” and speech based on “a simple theme of a higher living 
standard for the entire world.”78 Meanwhile, on March 15, Malenkov delivered a speech, 
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stating that all international disputes should “be decided by peaceful means, on the basis 
of mutual understanding.” Yet the Eisenhower administration interpreted Malenkov’s 
political gesture as launching a “peace offensive” with an aim to undermine the unity of 
the transatlantic community.79 Eisenhower had to once again reconsider his speech. After 
an intense internal debate that only featured opposing recommendations, Eisenhower felt 
frustrated. He decided to take charge and personally supervise final revisions of his 
speech entitled The Chance for Peace. 
 On April 16, 1953, Eisenhower delivered his first major foreign policy address. 
The Chance for Peace was translated into 45 languages and broadcasted through various 
media abroad funded by the U.S. government. In his speech, Eisenhower specifically 
addressed the new Soviet leadership under Georgy Malenkov and outlined specific 
policies that could lead to world peace. The President denounced the Soviet threat to 
freedom, and also stated that the new Soviet regime should “awaken, with the rest of the 
world, to the point of peril reached and help turn the tide of history.” The speech also 
featured some elements of fiscal conservatism, while Eisenhower cautioned that one 
heavy bomber costs “brick schools in more than thirty cities,” and that a single fighter 
plane costs the people “a half million bushels of wheat.” It was also on this occasion that 
Eisenhower for the first time hinted on the issue of arms control and disarmament by 
trying to revive the Baruch Plan and suggesting an international control of atomic energy 
to “insure the prohibition of atomic weapons,” yet adding that “the details of such 
disarmament programs are manifestly critical and complex.”80 A confidential memo of 
Radio Free Europe, one of the government sponsored media abroad that broadcasted The 
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Chance for Peace, concluded that the speech marked the end of containment policy, 
while launching a new policy of liberation.81 Despite Eisenhower’s intentions to deliver a 
speech that would call for “honest acts of peace,” The Chance for Peace only stirred a 
wave of criticism from the Soviet media.82 Even though Eisenhower hoped to genuinely 
offer a chance for peace, his speech made very clear that the political status quo in 
Eastern Europe needed to change prior to alleviating tensions and reducing armaments on 
both sides of the Atlantic. In the end, The Chance for Peace was unsuccessful in 
initiating a constructive U.S.-Soviet dialogue. 
 By the time Malenkov delivered his Speech to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on 
August 8, 1953, the global security situation had stabilized with the signing of the Korean 
armistice. Although not overtly involved in the conflict, the Soviets played an active role 
in reaching the armistice by encouraging the Chinese to accept the cease-fire. Malenkov, 
similar to Eisenhower, called for “preserving and consolidating peace,” although 
Malenkov also cautioned against “aggressive elements of the North Atlantic bloc” that 
according to him constituted “the principal danger to peace.” Additionally, the Soviet 
leader warned against forces “working against the policy of relaxing international tension 
and trying to frustrate it at any cost, all happening under the atomic blackmail.”83 To ease 
the existing international tensions, Malenkov demanded the People’s Republic of China’s 
acceptance as a “Big Five Power” represented at the UNSC and likewise called for the 
banning of “atomic and other arms of mass destruction.”84 Even though both American 
and Soviet leaders delivered speeches calling for peace, U.S.-Soviet relations did not 
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progress as Eisenhower had hoped. The insurmountable differences between the West 
and East continued to perpetuate the mutual fear, suspicion, and mistrust. A constructive 
dialogue leading to a permanent peaceful coexistence remained an aspiration without a 
concrete foundation.  
 On October 30, 1953, Eisenhower approved NSC 162/2, the Basic National 
Security Policy. The two most rudimentary goals of the United States outlined in the 
document lay in “meeting the Soviet threat,” while avoiding a serious “weakening of the 
U.S. economy or undermining [U.S.] fundamental values and institutions.” For national 
defense purposes, the policy demanded that America maintain a force capable of 
“inflicting massive retaliatory damage by offensive striking power,” a “strong and 
growing economy,” as well as sound “morale, free institutions, and the willingness of the 
U.S. people to support the measures necessary for national security.”85 These three 
principles proved essential to the Eisenhower administration’s pursuit of national security 
strategy. Above all, Eisenhower emphasized the need to balance the national defense 
spending to preserve the economic health of the United States, which he considered vital 
to maintaining American values and the American way of life. Throughout his two terms 
in the White House, Eisenhower managed to keep the defense spending at a relatively 
stable level accounting to around ten percent of the U.S. Gross Domestic Product (GDP). 
At the same time, the national defense spending as a percentage of the U.S. federal 
outlays continued to decrease from initial 69.4% in 1953 to 50.8% in 1961.86  
 NSC 162/2, however, did not specify whether the administration should pursue 
the policy of containment or a more progressive policy of liberation indicated in the 
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Eisenhower’s Chance for Peace address. Following a long debate between the 
Department of State and the Department of Defense, the NSC paper had eventually 
eschewed a definitive conclusion. The JCS, however, continued for over a year to push 
for a more aggressive policy. Even though Eisenhower himself initially leaned towards a 
more active U.S. policy toward the Soviet controlled states, considering that in a scenario 
where the United States had to choose between a total war and a dictatorial regime, the 
U.S. leadership might face “a duty to future generations […] to initiate war at the most 
propitious moment,” he eventually rejected the prospect of a rollback policy as well as 
rejected the concept of “a year of maximum danger” of NSC-68 approved by the Truman 
administration.87 Moreover, in 1954, Eisenhower continued to bring up the question at 
the NSC whether the United States should get ready for a fight with the Soviets; however, 
he remained profoundly concerned over a third world war involving nuclear weapons that 
would irrevocably change the world, and thus preferred the alternative of building up a 
strong national defense, while reinforcing transatlantic and transpacific security alliances.  
Throughout 1954, the NSC engaged in a review of national security policy that 
resulted in NSC 5501, the new Basic National Security. The JCS again stressed a more 
“aggressive” strategy towards the Soviet Union before it acquired a large nuclear arsenal. 
Predicting that by the period of 1956-1959 both the United States and the Soviet Union 
would achieve “atomic plenty,” the JCS projected that while mutual deterrence might 
stabilize the strategic equilibrium, it might lessen “the deterrent to peripheral aggression.” 
Secretary of State Dulles disagreed, arguing that the existing U.S. policy including 
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foreign aid and covert actions sufficed to deal with the Soviet threat.88  Similarly to 
Secretary Dulles, Eisenhower also preferred the more conservative policy of containment 
as to avoid escalating the political pressure and possibly provoking a general war. In 
August 1954, Eisenhower approved NSC 5422/2 entitled Guidelines under 162/2 for 
Fiscal Year 1956 concluding that in the period of 1956-1959 both sides would indeed 
reach mutual nuclear plenty. The NSC report also explicitly stated that a total war within 
this period using nuclear weapons would result in such “extensive destruction as to 
threaten the survival of Western civilization and the Soviet regime.”89 In the end, the 
NSC 5501 approved by the President in January 1955 unambiguously rejected “the 
concept of preventive war or acts intended to provoke war.”90 
 
NUCLEAR POLICY AND ARMS CONTROL 
 
One of the most powerful statements that Eisenhower made in his inaugural 
address in January 1953 concerned the threat of nuclear weapons. The President 
cautioned that science seemed ready to confer upon the world “the power to erase human 
life from this planet.”91 At the time, the United States represented the only power with a 
hydrogen bomb, detonating a two-stage thermonuclear device in the Pacific in November 
1952. Two months after the Presidential speech, CIA produced a Special National 
Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) that predicted the Soviets would likely acquire a hydrogen 
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bomb by mid-1955.92 Although Eisenhower would have never sacrificed the U.S. 
strategic superiority that eventually evolved into the strategic parity and the condition of 
Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, he continued to explore 
the option of international nuclear arms control during his presidency. During the first 
years of the Eisenhower presidency, the U.S. foreign policy relied on maintaining a 
robust nuclear arsenal capable of inflicting a massive retaliatory strike. Yet in December 
1953, Eisenhower addressed the UN General Assembly with an arms control speech 
known as Atoms for Peace that proposed the establishment of an Atomic Energy Agency 
(AEA) controlling an international nuclear stockpile available for peaceful uses.93 In spite 
of the objections from the Department of Defense, and particularly the JCS, Eisenhower 
decided to take the initiative and try to slow down an emerging nuclear arms race. Yet in 
the era of U.S. strategic superiority, the Soviets demanded an actual disarmament policy 
rather than an arms control initiative that would require verifications and on-site 
inspections resembling the Baruch Plan that had been previously rejected. One of the 
reasons Eisenhower decided to present a plan to impose an international control on 
nuclear material rested on testing the new Soviet regime under Nikita Khrushchev, who 
had become the Soviet General Secretary in September 1953.94 The Soviets raised their 
concerns shortly after the Presidential address, complaining that the U.S. proposal in no 
way represented a viable disarmament plan as it in no way hindered the development of 
nuclear and hydrogen weapons by any state. Furthermore, the plan did not intend to ban 
the use of such weapons, a precondition, which the Soviets continued to demand. In 
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March 1954, after several months of a diplomatic stalemate, Eisenhower met with the 
Soviet representatives to discuss the idea of an AEA. He highlighted the prospective 
value of such an international organization in “slowing the arms race by drawing off 
weapons materials from each side.” The negotiations eventually broke off after a few 
months due to the Soviet continual insistence on banning the use of nuclear weapons, 
which the U.S. administration opposed, taking into account the unavailability of workable 
mechanisms to detect “clandestine stocks of fissionable and fusionable materials.”95 
Although Eisenhower’s proposal did not manage to slow the emerging nuclear arms race 
between the United States and the Soviet Union, the Atoms for Peace initiative eventually 
came to fruition as a political framework supporting peaceful uses of nuclear energy 
under an international control. In 1955, the Soviets finally agreed to participate in the 
international pool of nuclear materials. Two years later, the UN established the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). 
During the first two years of the Eisenhower presidency, the United States 
enjoyed a comparative strategic military advantage vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, both in the 
number of nuclear bombs and in delivery vehicles. Thus, if the U.S. accommodated the 
Soviet response to the Atoms for Peace initiative to ban the use of nuclear weapons, the 
Soviet Union would virtually eliminate the U.S. strategic military lead. In 1953, for 
instance, the U.S. nuclear arsenal accounted for 1,436 bombs, while the Soviet nuclear 
weapon stock comprised of only 120 nuclear bombs. In addition, the United States 
represented the only power capable of delivering nuclear weapons over intercontinental 
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distances onboard of the B-47 Stratojet strategic bombers.96 Yet the intelligence estimates 
produced by the CIA presented the balance of strategic forces differently. The SNIE from 
July 1953 entitled Soviet Capabilities for Attack on the US through mid-1955 estimated 
that the Soviets might have up to 200 modified Tu-4 long-range bombers with extended 
combat radius, possibly also with the air-to-air refueling capability, available by 1955.97 
This prediction, as well as many other strategic intelligence estimates from the early 
years of the Eisenhower administration, proved greatly overstretched. In August 1953, 
the Soviet Union successfully tested a hydrogen bomb. Next year, in 1954, the Soviets 
indeed launched production of their first intercontinental bombers, the Mya-4 Bison and 
the Tu-95 Bear, although their production rate turned out to be far slower than the U.S. 
intelligence reports had estimated.98 In the same year, Secretary of State John Foster 
Dulles announced that the United States now officially followed a defense policy based 
on “massive retaliation.”99 Furthermore, the U.S. Secretary of Defense, Charles Wilson, 
announced the U.S. military strategy known as New Look that placed a heavy reliance on 
nuclear weapons rather than manpower.100 Consistent with the Eisenhower’s policy of 
fiscal conservatism outlined in NSC 162/2 that sought “bigger bang for a buck,” the 
United States used its nuclear force both for deterrence as well as a diplomatic leverage. 
Besides building up its nuclear stockpile comprising both strategic and tactical weapons, 
the Eisenhower administration also invested in continental defense, both in active 
measures such as the development of air defenses as well as anti-missile systems, and 
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later also passive defense systems such as the construction of nuclear shelters. One of the 
most significant active defense measures of the first two years of the Eisenhower 
presidency represented the construction of the Distant Early Warning (DEW) radar net 
across the Canadian far north initiated in December 1954.101 
Nevertheless, in 1954, the RAND Corporation issued two alarming reports that 
evaluated the possibility of a surprise Soviet strike on U.S. Strategic Air Command 
(SAC) bases. One study headed by Albert Wohlstetter concluded that the SAC bases’ 
vulnerability presented a major strategic issue.102 The other RAND study looking at the 
SAC vulnerability to a Soviet first strike by 1956 came to a shocking conclusion that the 
Soviet bombers, particularly if approaching from the South, might be capable of 
destroying “two-thirds or more of SAC bomber and reconnaissance aircraft at a cost of 50 
or fewer bombs and aircraft.”103 Similarly, CIA produced equally alarming estimates; for 
instance, the November 1954 SNIE entitled Probable Warning of Soviet Attack on the US 
through mid-1957 warned against a potential Soviet full-scale attack on the United States 
that might involve up to 850 long-range aircraft and 500 tanker aircraft by 1957.104 The 
CIA estimates of Soviet forces from 1954 proved particularly exaggerated, mainly due to 
the lack of U.S. intelligence resources that could obtain credible assessments of the 
Soviet military machinery. President Eisenhower required reliable intelligence for two 
principal reasons: first, to continually adjust the U.S. military posture as to provide for 
the most effective defense of the United States to a possible although unlikely surprise 
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Soviet attack, and second, to help project national defense spending in advance as to 
avoid excessive military expenditures stemming from a long-term uncertainty.  
By 1954, Eisenhower not only had to tackle foreign intelligence collection, but 
also internal security of the United States. Peacetime intelligence and espionage 
represented an increasingly pressing security issue even within the U.S. borders; in June 
1953, Julius and Ethel Rosenberg became the first spies sentenced to death by a U.S. civil 
court for passing nuclear information to the Soviets.105 Eisenhower took several steps to 
strengthen domestic counter-intelligence and internal security. In May 1954, he ordered 
the Department of Justice to establish an internal security division to expedite the 
prosecution of spies and saboteurs. What is more, in September 1954, Eisenhower signed 
the Espionage and Sabotage Act of 1954 that authorized death penalty for peacetime 
espionage and sabotage.106 Yet Eisenhower soon faced a moral dilemma when he needed 
to authorize illegal overflights of the Soviet Union. On November 24, 1954, DCI Dulles 
addressed a memorandum to the President expressing a grave concern over “large gaps in 
the U.S. intelligence coverage of the Soviet Union […], in particular, with respect to 
[Soviet] capabilities and intentions to launch nuclear attacks on the United States” and 
recommended an approval of “a national requirement for high-altitude reconnaissance 
flights.”107 Two days later, President Eisenhower approved the secret aerial 
reconnaissance project, codenamed “U-2.” 
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SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND OVERHEAD INTELLIGENCE 
 
 Due to an increasing need for credible intelligence on the Soviet military 
developments, the Eisenhower administration searched for ways to obtain Imagery 
Intelligence (IMINT) and Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) on the assets and areas of the 
Soviet Union situated beyond the range of the existing Boeing RB-29 and RB-47 
reconnaissance aircraft.108 In July 1954, President Eisenhower established the 
Technological Capabilities Panel (TCP) that comprised of prominent U.S. scientists and 
military experts headed by James R. Killian, the President of the Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology (MIT). The so-called “Killian Commission” became more and more 
distressed with the poor state of the nation’s intelligence resources needed to estimate 
Soviet capabilities. After studying a proposal of the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation for 
the CL-282 high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft, the Commission became increasingly 
confident that the aircraft could photograph the Soviet Union’s bomber fleet and provide 
an accurate assessment of the Soviet strategic force. While the U.S. Air Force refused to 
build the CL-282 aircraft fearing that it would jeopardize its other aircraft projects, the 
new reconnaissance aircraft eventually received a green light under the joint umbrella of 
the CIA and the Air Force; whereas the CIA would manage the flights, the Air Force 
would provide operational assistance.109 On November 4, 1954, Edwin H. Land, 
Chairman of Project Three of the TCP, addressed a report to DCI Dulles, in which he 
portrayed aerial reconnaissance as “urgent and presently feasible.” Land presented a 
convincing argument justifying prospective illegal overflights of the Soviet Union by 
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underscoring the fundamental difference in terms of information transparency between 
the United States and the Soviet Union. While the Soviets had “free access to the 
geography of all [U.S.] bases and major nuclear facilities, as well as to entire [U.S] 
military and civilian economy, [the United States] has been blocked from the 
corresponding knowledge about Russia.” Land also cautioned that the opportunity of 
deep reconnaissance overflights may not last for long since the Soviets continue to 
improve their air defenses and will eventually be capable of intercepting the aircraft.110 
After Dulles forwarded the TCP recommendation to Eisenhower, the CL-282 aircraft 
codenamed “U-2” received a Presidential “go-ahead” for research, development, and 
testing on November 26, 1954.  
 Meanwhile, both the United States and the Soviet Union made significant 
advances in rocketry as well as nuclear weaponry. By 1953, both sides had detonated a 
thermonuclear device, the predecessor of the hydrogen bomb, and deliberated whether 
the device could be weaponized. In the summer of 1953, the U.S. Air Force Science 
Advisory Board created a special committee that evaluated nuclear weapons, including a 
prospective hydrogen bomb, and means of their delivery.111 The committee headed by 
John von Neumann concluded that both fission and fusion bombs could be eventually 
delivered by a ballistic missile with a sufficient throw weight. In March 1954, the United 
States successfully demonstrated the practicability of a hydrogen bomb with a 
lightweight design during a test in the Pacific. It now became clear that the 
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) would represent the ultimate delivery vehicle 
for nuclear weapons.  
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 Another scientific committee formed in 1953 and also led by Neumann looked at 
U.S. strategic missile programs. The so called “Teapot Committee” issued a report in 
early 1954 that evaluated the existing intelligence and inconclusively suggested the 
Soviet advances in rocketry might have surpassed those of the United States.  By 
assessing the present Air Force long-range missile projects as “unsatisfactory,” the 
committee recommended a thorough reorganization of the ballistic missile effort giving 
the top priority to the prospective Atlas ICBM. At around the same time, the RAND 
Corporation produced a similar study that also “confirmed the feasibility of the Atlas 
ICBM,” estimating its initial operational capability by 1960.112 Eventually, both the Air 
Force and President Eisenhower agreed that the development of an ICBM represented a 
project of major importance to national security. On September 13, 1955, Eisenhower 
designated the ICBM as a national program of top priority. 
 In March 1954, the RAND Corporation produced a comprehensive report on earth 
satellites that represented the culmination of the organization’s eight years experience in 
satellite research. The study entitled Project Feed Back provided a detailed analysis of 
the feasibility of “an unconventional reconnaissance method” using a satellite launched in 
Low Earth Orbit (LEO) that would feed the “television pictures” acquired in orbit back to 
ground stations. By estimating that such a satellite might reach an initial operational 
capability in about seven years, the report concluded that the resulting IMINT might 
eventually lead to “a major reversal of [U.S.] strategic intelligence posture with respect to 
the Soviets.” Finally, Project Feed Back recommended to the Air Force that “the program 
be continued on a full-scale basis.”113 
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CHAPTER III 
U.S. SPACE POLICY 
 
 While the Eisenhower administration continued to search for a way to gain 
credible intelligence estimates of the Soviet military developments, scientists from all 
over the world envisaged an international project comprised of observations of various 
geophysical phenomena during the period of the so-called International Geophysical Year 
(IGY), spanning from July 1957-December 1958.114 Only a few months after the RAND 
Corporation recommended that the Air Force develop a reconnaissance satellite, on 
October 1954, the Special Committee for the IGY (CSAGI) recommended that 
governments participating in the IGY attempt to launch an earth satellite.115 The CSAGI 
recommendation, however, did not originate from the scientific community. In fact, it 
was the Eisenhower administration that secretly made sure that the U.S. delegation to the 
CSAGI brought up the recommendation to launch a scientific satellite during the IGY.  
At the time, the Soviets vehemently condemned U.S. reconnaissance flights conducted 
only along the periphery of the Soviet borders. Some American aircraft had even been 
shot down by the Soviets.116 With the U-2 project in a developmental phase, the prospect 
of establishing a legal precedent for the freedom of space, which would pave the way for 
an eventual reconnaissance satellite, deserved the full attention of President Eisenhower. 
Therefore, in 1954, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Development, 
Donald Quarles, who had been aware of the U.S. military space program, recognized the 
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IGY as an ideal opportunity to establish a legal precedent for orbiting reconnaissance 
satellites over the Soviet Union. Quarles along with Alan Waterman, President of the 
National Science Foundation (NSF), worked behind the scenes and ultimately made sure 
that the CSAGI recommended the states participating in the IGY to launch a scientific 
satellite.117  
In February 1955, the TCP headed by James Killian produced a comprehensive 
report entitled Meeting the Threat of Surprise Attack that indeed recommended that the 
United States embarks on a scientific satellite program that would establish a legal 
precedent for the freedom of space and hence allow for the prospective launch of a 
reconnaissance satellite.118 One month later, following up on the recommendations of the 
Project Feed Back study, the Air Force secretly disseminated General Operational 
Requirement #90 (SA-2C) that provided selected U.S. defense contractors with the 
specifics of the secret military satellite program codenamed Project WS-117L.119 In 
March, the NSC concluded that the existing opportunity to launch a scientific satellite 
into an orbit “presents an early opportunity to establish a precedent for distinguishing 
between ‘national air’ and ‘international space,’ a distinction which could be to our 
advantage at some future date when we might employ larger satellites for intelligence 
purposes.”120 Even though the March NSC meeting did not approve of the development 
of a military satellite, it indicated that the administration early on considered using outer 
space for intelligence purposes.  
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On May 26, 1955, the NSC gathered for its 250th meeting. Dillon Anderson, 
Eisenhower’s National Security Adviser, opened up the meeting by briefing the Council 
on the contents of NSC 5520, Statement of Policy on the U.S. Scientific Satellite 
Program. President Eisenhower, who had been briefed on NSC 5520 prior to the meeting, 
then called on Donald Quarles, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and 
Development, to provide the Council with greater details of the earth satellite project.121 
NSC 5520 concluded that the United States was now “believed to have the technical 
capability to establish successfully a small scientific satellite of the earth in the near 
future.” It also recommended that while emphasizing “the peaceful purposes of the 
launching of such a satellite,” the satellite launch should take place during the IGY. From 
a military and intelligence perspective, the Statement of Policy stated that although a 
small scientific satellite will not be capable of carrying “surveillance equipment,” and 
thus will not have “direct intelligence potential,” it will “represent a technological step 
toward the achievement of the large surveillance satellite.” Furthermore, NSC 5520 
stated that the JCS agreed with the launching of a scientific satellite, but only if it did not 
impede on the prospective development of a large reconnaissance satellite, of which 
“intelligence applications,” according to the JCS, “strongly warranted” its 
construction.122 
At the conclusion of the NSC 5520 presentation to the NCS, Eisenhower pointed out that 
“while this earth satellite was rather a minor affair, if we subsequently put up a 
reconnaissance satellite, then we would be getting into the ‘big stuff’.” After the 
President inquired whether any Council members perceived any objections to NSC 5520, 
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none of the members raised any. Allen Dulles added that “it was very important to make 
this attempt.”123 The President approved NSC 5520 on May 27, 1955. 
The approval of NSC 5520 gave the United States its first official space policy. 
On July 28, 1955, the White House Press Secretary James Hagerty released a press 
statement announcing the Presidential approval to launch “small earth-circling satellites” 
as part of the U.S. participation in the IGY.124 Shortly after, the Soviets likewise 
announced their plans to launch a scientific satellite within the period of the IGY. The 
United States and the Soviet Union now entered a space arms race; both sides understood 
that the first country in space would harvest significant international recognition. The 
U.S. satellite launching endeavor was initially comprised of three projects. The Army 
proposed Project Orbiter, the Navy presented a space launch vehicle based on Viking 
sounding rockets, and the Air Force offered the Atlas B missile for a prospective 
launcher. The Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Special Capabilities headed by Homer J. 
Steward was established to evaluate the competing proposals and choose the best project 
that would ensure the U.S. launch of a satellite during the IGY. Eventually, in August 
1955, the so-called “Stewart Committee” selected the Navy proposal, which became 
known as Project Vanguard.125 The Stewart Committee’s majority vote for Project 
Vanguard was likely influenced by the Navy’s impressive plans for advanced scientific 
components and electronics of the launch vehicle as well as the radio tracking system 
known as “Minitrack.”126 While the Air Force Atlas B proposal was shelved early on by 
the panel as not to interfere with the ICBM development that had been designated by the 
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President as the top national priority, the Army’s Project Orbiter based on Redstone 
missile seemed very promising, particularly in being able to launch the U.S. satellite 
earlier than Vanguard.127 Even though Wernher von Braun, who led the Redstone 
project, tried to “sway the Committee” by promising that the Orbiter missile could launch 
a satellite within 90 days, the panel increasingly leaned towards choosing a non-military 
missile project. In the end, by choosing Project Vanguard, the Stewart Committee 
preferred the scientific nature of satellite launches over becoming the first country to 
launch an earth satellite.   
 
OPEN SKIES PROPOSAL 
 
Although NSC 5520 approved the development of the first U.S. satellite, the 
pressing need for reliable intelligence on the Soviet Union shifted the attention to the U-2 
project.  While Eisenhower had decided in late 1954 that the U-2 project would proceed 
regardless of the Soviet reactions resulting from the violation of the Soviet airspace, the 
upcoming summit in Geneva presented the President with a unique opportunity to 
propose an international agreement allowing both sides to conduct aerial photography of 
military installations in their countries.128 In July 1955, Eisenhower made his “Open 
Skies” proposal at the Geneva summit; although, as it had been expected by the U.S. 
administration, the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev immediately rejected it calling it 
“nothing more than a bald espionage plot against the Soviet Union.”129 Khrushchev 
insisted that any arms control proposal must be accompanied by disarmament 
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measures.130  A few weeks after the summit, Chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers 
Nikolai Bulganin wrote to Eisenhower criticizing his “Open Skies” proposal. Bulganin 
reiterated that the proposal did not seem equitable since it did not contain arms reduction 
provisions and that aerial overflights themselves would not be invulnerable to denial and 
deception measures.131 After all, the Soviets had much less to gain from the “Open Skies” 
proposal than the United States. In 1955, the United States had a much larger nuclear 
arsenal as well as a greater number of long-range nuclear delivery vehicles than the 
Soviet Union; therefore, if the aerial inspections indeed took place and both parties would 
use the information of strategic intelligence value for targeting purposes, the United 
States would have enjoyed a considerable strategic advantage.132 Conversely, the Soviets 
had little to gain from the prospective mutual overflights agreement as they already had a 
comparative advantage in the open source knowledge of U.S. strategic bases as well as 
nuclear facilities. In addition, the Soviets might have also wanted to deliberately preserve 
the secrecy over their advanced rocketry development that at the time received a high 
national priority.133 Through bringing up the “Open Skies” proposal on the international 
scene, President Eisenhower publicly strengthened the U.S. commitment to the peaceful 
uses of not only airspace, but also eventually outer space. Before the Geneva summit, 
Eisenhower privately stated that if the Soviets did not accept the proposal, he would 
nevertheless approve the U-2 flights.134 Although the Soviets continued to insist on actual 
disarmament rather than arms control, they did eventually agree to some overflights. In 
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November 1956, the Soviets agreed to aerial inspections up to 800 kilometers on either 
side of the line separating East from West in Europe.135  
One month after the summit in Geneva, even before Moscow had delivered its 
official response to “Open Skies,” the U-2 prototype took off for its first test flight. 
Eisenhower consequently held a meeting in the Oval Office to consider the details of the 
operational use of the aircraft.136 In order to avoid committing an overt act of aggression 
against the Soviet Union, the U-2 project had to rely on plausible deniability. In May 
1956, the CIA’s Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI) conducted a vulnerability study, 
which concluded that while some of the Soviet radars might detect the aircraft, “it is 
doubtful that the Soviets can achieve [its] consistent tracking.”137 Furthermore, fearing 
that in case of a malfunction the Soviets might seize the aircraft and also the pilot, 
Eisenhower was assured by DCI Dulles that due to the high operating altitude, the U-2 
would disintegrate and almost certainly the pilot would not survive.138 These findings 
alleviated President’s concerns about possible political repercussion resulting from the 
overflights of the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, in the summer of 1955, U.S. intelligence 
collectors in Moscow attended the Soviet Aviation Day. The flyover of the new Bison 
strategic bomber left a strong impression on both diplomatic and military representatives 
present at the show; however, as a squadron of 10 Bison aircraft conducted three 
continuous flyovers in large circles, U.S. collectors incorrectly assessed and reported 
back that the Soviet Union had 30 of these long-range bombers. Analysts consequently 
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estimated that the Soviets were committed to increasing their heavy bomber force.139 
Although the number of existing Soviet bomber was far lower than the U.S. intelligence 
community had estimated, there was hard evidence that the Soviets indeed had the 
capability to produce bombers at a higher rate if they desired so.140 The so-called 
“bomber gap” soon reverberated among the members of Congress and also the American 
public. Several aviation journals as well as newspapers featured articles with headlines 
such as: “Is U.S. Really Losing the Air?”141 As the public and political pressure along 
with intelligence and military demands mounted, President eventually decided to 
authorize U-2 overflights of the Soviet Union in June 1956.  
 
MILITARY SPACE PROGRAM 
 
On March 15, 1956, President Eisenhower approved NSC 5602/1, the new Basic 
National Security Policy that superseded NSC 5501 from 1955. NSC 5602/1 reiterated 
that the fundamental threat to the United States laid in Soviet nuclear weapons. Similarly 
to NSC 5501, it restated that as the Soviet Union and the United States approached 
nuclear parity, U.S. policy must reject the prospect of a preventive nuclear war or acts 
intended to provoke a nuclear confrontation. Although space capabilities did not yet play 
a part in the U.S. security policy, NSC 5602/1 made clear that the United States must 
continue to strengthen its deterrent with a particular emphasis on continental defense. 
With regard to intelligence capabilities, the policy stated that the United States should 
develop an intelligence system that would provide “maximum prior warning of possible 
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aggression.”142 On June 5, 1956, the NSC produced NSC 5606, a comprehensive policy 
on continental defense. It concluded that a robust continental defense would give the 
United States an enhanced deterrent, lessen the prospect of a Soviet surprise strike with 
devastating consequences, as well as provide the United States with a capability to adapt 
and make timely changes to its technologies as the threat continues to change.143 With 
regard to continental defense against ballistic missiles, the report noted that several 
studies had already indicated the technological feasibility of an early warning system. 
Indeed, the first such a study that looked at the infrared detection of hot plumes of an 
ascending ballistic missile was conducted in 1948 by Naval Research Laboratory (NRL). 
In 1955, the RAND Corporation also produced a similar study that suggested using earth 
satellites instead of patrolling aircraft to provide early warning of a ballistic missile 
launch.144 When the U.S. Air Force disseminated its operational requirements for military 
satellite program Project WS-117L in 1955, it did not contain provisions for an infrared 
sensor. Yet when the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation won the Air Force contract for a 
reconnaissance satellite in October 1956, it proposed an additional development of “a 
satellite equipped with an infrared radiometer and telescope” that would detect hot 
plumes of an ascending ballistic missile. By 1957, Lockheed’s proposal for an infrared 
satellite was designated as Subsystem G of WS-117L. Subsystem G eventually became the 
Missile Defense Alarm System (MIDAS) in 1958.145 Two other subsystems of WS-117L 
at the time represented the original reconnaissance satellite named Project Corona and 
the Satellite and Missile Observation System (SAMOS).  
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In 1956, however, WS-117L received low priority compared to the development 
of a scientific satellite that would be launched during the IGY and establish the principle 
of “a peaceful overflight.” In May 1956, one year after President Eisenhower approved 
NSC 5520, the NSC held a meeting to discuss the progress of the U.S. space program. 
Alan Waterman, briefed the Council on the status of the program and recommended that 
the United States launch an additional six satellites in addition to those six originally 
planned in NSC 5520 in order to get more complete and precise scientific information 
from U.S. space efforts. Although Eisenhower did not object to Waterman’s suggestion, 
he saw no reason at the time to earmark funds for additional satellites. There was much 
concern about the prospect of the mounting cost of satellite endeavors. Eisenhower 
admitted at the meeting that he had not been initially enthusiastic about the U.S. space 
program; however, he understood that after making a public announcement, the United 
States now could not back off from its commitment.146 A few months later, the 
Department of Defense issued its satellite progress report that examined alternatives to 
the Vanguard Space Launch Vehicle (SLV), concluding that additional development 
programs based on Atlas or Redstone missiles would not offer a significantly better 
variant to the existing Vanguard. In addition, the report concluded that the launching of 
an additional six satellites as proposed by the NSF would not increase the probability of 
success of the U.S. satellite program.147 Meanwhile, in April 1956, the Air Force gave a 
green light to the development of the U.S. military space program. Because of budget 
constraints, however, WS-117L was initially significantly underfunded. It was not until 
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the launch of Soviet Sputnik in 1957 that eventually resulted in more funding for the 
space reconnaissance project.  
While the U.S. leadership debated the best approach to establish presence in outer 
space, the Soviets vigorously pursued their space program. Compared to the U.S. space 
program that comprised separate scientific and military components, the Soviets had a 
unified program primarily centered on the scientific exploration of outer space. 
Nevertheless, the Soviets devoted their space effort to a large booster, the R-7 rocket, 
which certainly had limited military application.148 Indeed, it technically became the 
world’s first ICBM in August 1957. Nevertheless, due to military limitations that 
stemmed from its bulky design that prevented the missile from emplacement into silos as 
well as the inefficient fueling system that hindered its operational readiness, the Soviets 
never deployed more than six R-7 missiles.149 An NIE dated November 1956 estimated 
that the Soviet Union had “one of the most comprehensive and well-planned [space] 
programs of any of the countries participating in the IGY.” The CIA report also noted 
that the USSR was engaged in the development of earth satellites for research at very 
high altitudes, while providing no indication that the Soviets intended to develop a 
satellite with military or intelligence capabilities.150 After Khrushchev became the First 
Secretary of the Communist Party, the political climate within the Soviet Union started to 
change considerably. In 1956, Khrushchev for the first time as the leader of the Soviet 
Union condemned the crimes committed by Joseph Stalin. Although the speech was 
secret, it eventually leaked outside of the Soviet Union. On June 4, 1956, the U.S. 
                                                          
148 Gruntman, Mike. Blazing the Trail: The Early History of Spacecraft and Rocketry, 288-293. 
149 Ibid., 289. 
150 CIA. NIE 11-6-56: Capabilities and Trend of Soviet Science and Technology. CIA, 1956. 
56 
 
Department of State released the text of the Khrushchev’s speech.151 The year 1956 also 
brought about an important arms control measure. One year after the Soviets agreed to 
participate in the international pool of nuclear materials proposed by President 
Eisenhower, twelve nations, including the United States and the Soviet Union agreed 
upon a charter for the IAEA.152 The IAEA was established in 1957 as the principal 
international body overseeing the peaceful use of nuclear energy. 
 
SPUTNIK AND EXPLORER 
 
On January 21, 1957, Eisenhower officially began his second term of the 
presidency. Three days later, the NSC convened again to discuss the status of the U.S. 
satellite program. One of the most pressing issues facing the program that worried the 
President stemmed from the rising cost; from the original 20$ million, the cost of 
launching six earth satellites had now increased to $80 million. Yet Eisenhower agreed to 
proceed with the launches with the first one scheduled for October 1957. DCI Allen 
Dulles noted that the Soviets likely intended to become the first nation in space. Alan 
Waterman then added, that while the Soviets might surpass the U.S. effort in the 
development of an SLV, they would unlikely produce better satellite instrumentation.153  
In fact, the Soviet development of an SLV did not commence as a separate 
program, but rather built on the development of an ICBM. Whereas President Eisenhower 
designated the Atlas ICBM a national program of top priority in 1955, the Soviets had 
                                                          
151 Vexler, Robert. Dwight D. Eisenhower: 1890-1969, 31. 
152 Ibid., 31. 
153 NSC Meeting Notes. 310th Meeting of NSC. January 24, 1957. 
57 
 
made their ICBM program a top priority a year earlier.154 One of the Soviet ICBM 
projects was the large R-7 (SS-6) rocket that was designed to carry a heavy payload, 
possibly to accommodate a thermonuclear warhead.155 One year later, the Soviets started 
to develop the R-16 (SS-7) ICBM that would be a missile more suitable for large-scale 
deployment than the R-7. While the United States relied on a scientific rocket program to 
launch its first satellite in space, the Soviet Union selected a military missile that had the 
most promising throw weight for a successful launch of the first Soviet satellite.  
The development of Sputnik atop of the R-7 was strongly advocated by Sergei 
Korolev, the Soviet rocket scientist who headed the OKB-1, the Central Design Bureau 
of Experimental Machine Building. Mikhail Tikhonravov, working alongside Korolev, 
was the Soviet scientist in charge of the development of Sputnik. After the United States 
and the Soviet Union announced their plans to launch scientific satellites during the IGY 
in July and August 1955 respectively, the Soviets became determined to become the first 
nation in space. In January 1956, Korolev received a green light from the Soviet 
leadership to proceed with the plan to launch the first Soviet satellite using the R-7 
rocket. Initially, the concept of a first Soviet satellite called Object D envisioned a 
satellite that would have a total mass of 1,000-1,400 kilograms. To speed up the 
prospective launch, Korolev and Tikhonravov decided to first build a much lighter 
satellite that would allow for an earlier launch attempt. In January 1957, Korolev 
addressed a memo to the USSR Council of Ministers asking for permission to prepare 
and launch a satellite even before the official start of the IGY in July 1957. Korolev 
believed at the time that the United States had already attempted to launch a satellite in 
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September 1956, although unsuccessfully. One month later, the Soviet government 
approved Korolev’s proposal. The lighter version of Object D was designated Object PS 
(Sputnik) and weighed less than 84 kilograms.156 
While the Navy worked on the Vanguard SLV, it also developed a small scientific 
satellite. Compared to the Soviet satellite plans, the U.S. efforts were much more modest. 
The first U.S. satellite that was scheduled for launch atop Vanguard weighed only 1.5 
kilograms. It carried two transistorized transmitters that would send signals back to Earth. 
One of the transmitters was powered by six solar cells, while the other was powered by a 
mercury-battery.157 Whereas the Navy successfully tested a Vanguard prototype in late 
1956, the Army waited for its chance. The Army’s ballistic missile programs were far 
ahead of the Navy. In fact, the Army could have placed a small satellite in orbit at an 
earlier date than Vanguard promised. In September 1956, the Army successfully tested 
the multistage Jupiter C composite vehicle that reached an altitude of 1097 kilometers 
and impacted the area 5336 kilometers away from the launch point. The fourth stage 
carried a 9 kilogram payload. Interestingly, if the fourth stage was replaced with the 
Army’s Sergeant missile, the first U.S. satellite could have been successfully launched in 
orbit during the test.158 Jupiter C, however, did not carry a satellite as Korolev described 
in his memo addressed to the USSR Council of Ministers in early 1957. Unfortunately, 
the Army had been banned from the satellite effort since 1955. 
Prior to the Soviet launch of Sputnik in October 1957, the NSC met once again in 
May to talk about the progress of the U.S. satellite effort. To the President’s dismay, the 
cost rose again to $110 million. What is more, it became evident that the United States 
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and the Soviet Union were now engaged in a space race. DCI Dulles noted that if the 
Soviets managed to launch the satellite first, they would achieve a powerful propaganda 
weapon. Eisenhower, much concerned about the rising cost as well as the prospect of 
falling behind the Soviets in the satellite effort, sadly noted that there was a lesson to be 
learned: “In the future, let us avoid any bragging until we know we have succeeded in 
accomplishing our objectives.” He then urged the Council to proceed with the simplest 
possible satellite with an attempted launch at an earliest date.159 
 On October 4, 1957, the Soviet Union successfully launched the world’s first 
satellite. The Soviets had well planned the announcement of their accomplishment. On 
that day, several prominent American scientists were invited to the Soviet Embassy in 
Washington, D.C. to celebrate the IGY. While enjoying the celebration, Moscow radio 
broadcasted the astonishing news that the Soviet Union had launched Sputnik.160 
Although the U.S. intelligence community expected the launch, the public was caught 
entirely by surprise. Shortly after, the White House held a press conference. In response 
to the question, whether the administration was upset about losing the space race, Press 
Secretary James Hagerty stated that the administration never thought of the U.S. program 
“as one which was in a race with the Soviets.”161 On October 10, the NSC convened to 
discuss the “implications of the Soviet earth satellite for U.S. security.” DCI Dulles 
reaffirmed that the U.S. intelligence community predicted the launch as well as had 
already collected telemetric data on Sputnik even before the Soviet public announcement. 
Dulles also noted that the Soviets now launched a trilogy of propaganda; besides Sputnik, 
the Soviets bragged about their successful test of an ICBM and also the recent large-scale 
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test of a hydrogen bomb. Secretary of the Air Force Donald Quarles then noted that the 
Soviets had now proven helpful at least in establishing the freedom of space. Space now 
became an international domain rather than national as Sputnik flew over practically 
every nation on Earth. Towards the end of the meeting, President Eisenhower made an 
interesting remark. After reading a newspaper article that featured an allegation that 
according to “two so-called intelligence people” Sputnik was actually taking photographs 
of the United States, President inquired where did such a story come from. Secretary 
Quarles said he did not know of anyone who would make such a claim, although he could 
not know with absolute certainty that the Soviet satellite could not indeed perform such a 
mission.162 
 Facing an enormous public pressure fueled by a critical media campaign, the 
Eisenhower administration needed to respond and prove that the U.S. scientific 
establishment was not inferior to that of the Soviets. The Vanguard project seemed to 
progress steadily. After the initial test of the first Test Vehicle (TV) in December 1956, 
the Navy conducted two additional tests, TV-1 and TV-2, on May 1 and October 23, 
1957 respectively. The TV-3 that would for the first time carry a satellite was scheduled 
for launch on December 6, 1957.163 Meanwhile, the Soviets successfully launched their 
second satellite, Sputnik 2, on November 3, 1957. Sputnik 2 was a much larger satellite 
weighing almost 509 kilograms and for the first time also carried a “live passenger,” a 
dog name Laika. On December 6, broadcasted live on U.S. television stations, the U.S. 
attempted a public satellite launch using Vanguard TV-3. After the rocket ignited, it 
raised a few meters from the launch pad, but the first engine lost thrust and Vanguard 
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TV-3 exploded. The United States sustained another great loss, perhaps even greater than 
losing the space race to Sputnik earlier in October. The Vanguard fiasco precipitated a 
sense of “national humiliation.”164 Eisenhower now needed to convince the public that 
the United States did not represent a mere second-rate power to the Soviet Union. Yet in 
late 1957, the public concern over national security did not only stem from the failure to 
launch a satellite. On December 20, U.S. media published a leaked summary of 
recommendations of the top secret Gaither Report. The report, officially named 
Deterrence and Survival in the Nuclear Age, concluded that “evidence clearly indicates 
an increasing [Soviet] threat, which may become critical in 1959 or early 1960,” and 
recommended that the United States undertakes a comprehensive program to strengthen 
its deterrent and defense, including civilian protection by initiating a nation-wide nuclear 
fallout shelter program.165 Although Eisenhower believed that the findings of the Gaither 
Report greatly exaggerated the Soviet threat, the media warned that the nation faced a 
“cataclysmic peril.”166 In the interim, after the launch of Sputnik 2, the Army Ballistic 
Missile Agency (ABMA) was finally authorized to develop its own satellite.167 The 
Army intensively worked on its new satellite called Explorer I. It carried a cosmic ray 
instrument, micrometeorite instruments, and temperature sensors.168 In the end, there 
were two U.S. satellite launches scheduled for January 1958, one for Vanguard on 
January 18 and one for Jupiter-C on January 29. Eisenhower had still high hopes for 
Vanguard and asked his aide to issue him a draft of a press release in case Vanguard 
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manages to successfully launch the first U.S. satellite. The Navy’s Vanguard, however, 
experienced technical problems and the launch had to be postponed. Consequently, under 
the direction of Wernher von Braun, the Army took over the launch pad in Cape 
Canaveral and prepared for the launch of Explorer I. On January 31, 1958, the United 
States successfully launched its first satellite. 
 
PROSPECT FOR SPACE ARMS CONTROL 
 
 Even before any country launched a satellite in space, informal correspondence 
between the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union examining the prospect of 
space arms control commenced in early 1957. The Eisenhower administration initiated 
the debate with a proposal at the UN General Assembly in January, 1957. The U.S. 
delegation to the UN proposed that “the testing as well as inspection of outer space 
vehicles testing of outer space vehicles should be carried out and inspected under 
international auspices.” This proposal was in compliance with a broad U.S. policy on 
arms control seeking to ensure that the launching of satellites to outer space would be 
exclusively for peaceful and scientific purposes, while any military vehicles travelling 
through space for military purposes should be prohibited.169 Within the U.S. space policy, 
however, the term “peaceful” did not preclude U.S. satellites from having certain military 
applications.170 At the Four Power summit in August 1957, the U.S. slightly altered the 
proposal that called for “technical studies of the design of an inspection system, which 
would make it possible to assure that the sending of objects through outer space will be 
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exclusively for peaceful and scientific purposes.” The U.S. proposal thus also included 
ballistic missiles. Bulganin responded to Eisenhower by calling for nuclear disarmament 
as a precondition to space arms control. In January 1958, Eisenhower replied to Bulganin 
stating that the United States agrees that “outer space be used only for peaceful 
purposes,” but did not specify whether the United States would be willing to engage in 
actual disarmament talks. One month later, Bulganin wrote to Eisenhower that the Soviet 
Union was ready to discuss an agreement to ban nuclear weapons, including their testing, 
a prospective ban on ballistic missiles as well as the elimination of foreign bases on other 
nations’ territories. Under such conditions, according to Bulganin, the Soviet Union 
would welcome a space arms control agreement with no difficulties. Similarly to 
Bulganin, Khrushchev vehemently called on the West to “ban all nuclear weapons and 
evacuate overseas bases before the USSR would even discuss the peaceful uses of outer 
space.”171 In June 1958, Khrushchev addressed a letter to Eisenhower, in which he 
demanded that any space arms control initiative must also include a ban on ballistic 
missiles as well as the liquidation of U.S. bases on foreign soil. The discussion ended up 
in a stalemate. 
 Within the 1958 space arms control debate, the Soviets pursued a policy of 
obstructionism.172 Following the successful launch of the world’s first satellite, a test of 
the world’s first ICBM, and a large-scale hydrogen bomb test, the Soviet Union launched 
a comprehensive international propaganda campaign to praise their communist regime. 
Yet in reality, the Soviets were truly ahead of the United States only in their space 
program, particularly in the development of a SLV with a much higher throw weight. The 
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R-7 (SS-6) rocket, however, was not well suited for military use as an ICBM as the 
Soviets had publicly claimed. The R-7 had an unwieldy design that prevented it from 
prospective emplacement in hardened silos and used a propellant that could not be stored 
in the missile for an extended period of time. Nevertheless, the Soviets publicly 
maintained they were ahead of the United States in military rocketry. By the time the 
space arms control debate reached the UN Disarmament Committee in 1958, the Soviets 
were not ready to concede to any on-site inspections. First, Khrushchev believed that the 
United States would copy the design of the R-7 SLV. Second, he feared that the true 
military utility of the R-7 would be revealed, which would seriously undermine the 
Soviet deterrent at the time and make the Soviet Union vulnerable.173 
 The Eisenhower administration pursued space arms control negotiations within 
the framework of NSC 5814/1, the Preliminary U.S. Policy in Outer Space, issued on 
August 1958. NSC 5814/1 stated that international cooperation agreements could have 
the effect of “enhancing the position of the United States as a leader in advocating the 
uses of outer space for peaceful purposes” as well as provide an opportunity to “open up 
the Soviet Bloc.” The policy concluded that the United States had to retain the leading 
position in advocating the peaceful uses of outer space in the UN. Most importantly, NSC 
5814/1 made clear that the priority of the U.S. space program remained “the achievement 
of scientific, military, and political objectives.” Within military objectives, the priority 
was given to reconnaissance satellites, stating that such a satellite should be launched “at 
the earliest technologically practicable date.” Comparing the U.S. and Soviet space 
programs, the Preliminary U.S. Policy in Outer Space estimated that the Soviet Union 
was also capable of launching a reconnaissance satellite within the period of 1959-1961 if 
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they chose to do so.174 While the United States genuinely strived to establish a scientific 
cooperation with the Soviet Union, there is no indication that the Eisenhower 
administration ever considered abandoning the U.S. reconnaissance program. Besides 
seizing the initiative to publicly advocate peaceful uses of outer space, there might have 
been some other benefits from the prospective U.S.-Soviet scientific cooperation. In April 
1958, Maurice Stans, Director of the Bureau of the Budget, addressed a memo to Robert 
Cutler, the U.S. National Security Adviser at the time, in which he examined certain 
benefits from the U.S. “Science for Peace” initiative. Stans noted that from a military 
perspective, any prospective exchange of booster data with the Soviets would be in U.S. 
favor, especially after the Soviets had managed to launch a half-ton satellite.175 Yet 
Khrushchev had well known about the scientific value of the R-7. At the time, the R-7 
rocket remained the only triumph of the Soviet Union, which the Soviets continued to 
protect at all cost. 
 In December 1958, the U.S. delegation to the UN managed to convince the 
General Assembly to establish an Ad Hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer 
Space (COPUOS). Yet the Soviets immediately condemned the U.S. initiative by 
complaining that the Ad Hoc COPUOS included preferred member states, of which two-
thirds aligned with the West. Yevgeny Korovin, a prominent Soviet lawyer, accused the 
U.S. government of creating a “rigged preparatory group that would give the United 
States complete control of it.”176 The Soviet Union thus refused to take part in the Ad 
Hoc Committee, while demanding an equal representation. In late 1959, the UN approved 
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Resolution 1472 that established the standing COPUOS. In a new arrangement, four 
Eastern Bloc countries became members; the Committee now included members from 
twelve Western states, seven Communist states, and five neutral states. Whereas the 
Soviets now showed interest in a more balanced COPUOS, the Committee failed to 
convene until 1961 due to bureaucratic clashes concerning the designation of officers as 
well as the voting and decision-making mechanism.177  
During 1959, the U.S. position on space arms control started to depart from the 
earlier diplomatic rhetoric that enthusiastically advocated peaceful uses of outer space 
and began to focus rather on more pragmatic aspects. The U.S. delegation to the Ad Hoc 
COPUOS was advised by Karl Harr, Special Assistant to the President for Security 
Operations Coordination, to emphasize that the Committee should not be concerned with 
assuring the peaceful uses of outer space, but rather identify potential legal problems in 
the space code of conduct. Harr also recommended that the U.S. delegation calls attention 
to space as a domain that countries can use for national security purposes.178 While 
emphasizing benefits of international scientific cooperation in space affairs, the U.S. 
delegation to Ad Hoc COPUOS indeed made clear that there was no need for additional 
legal provisions, since the UN Charter had already included essential principles providing 
the legal framework for the code of conduct in outer space. Loftus Becker, a U.S. mission 
representative, pointed out that Article 51 of the UN Charter recognizes the inherent right 
of states to defend against an armed attack, while such a right is not restricted to the 
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terrestrial arena. Therefore, nations could pursue any space policies aimed at 
strengthening their national security.179  
In August 1959, the NSC issued NSC 5906/1, the new Basic National Security 
Policy, which for the first time incorporated outer space policy into the national security 
strategy. The Policy stated that the United States should “continue actively to pursue 
programs to develop and exploit outer space as needed to achieve scientific, military, and 
political purposes.” Furthermore, NSC 5906/1 outlined principal objectives of the U.S. 
space policy, including “a military space program designed to extend U.S military 
capabilities through application of advancing space technology.”180 In December 1959, 
the NSC approved NSC 5918, the new U.S. Policy on Outer Space that superseded NSC 
5814/1, the Preliminary U.S. Policy in Outer Space from August 1958. The new space 
policy concluded that to date, there had not been a multilateral agreement to proceed with 
an arms control or a disarmament initiative. The primary U.S. space policy objective 
outlined in the document called for the enhancement of “scientific knowledge, military 
strength, economic capabilities, and political position.” In the realm of military 
applications, the priority had been given to the reconnaissance satellite. The policy also 
examined Soviet space objectives, ranking manned space travel and scientific research as 
top priorities, while propaganda and military applications ranked as low priorities.181 
Meanwhile, the Soviets used the deadlocked COPUOS as an international platform to 
accuse the United States of space militarism. While the Soviets strived to portray U.S. 
space policy as an aggressive initiative seeking military superiority, the United States 
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started to launch the first series of reconnaissance satellites in 1959. The era of space 
militarization had begun. 
 
 
ROAD TO SPACE MILITARIZATION 
 
By 1958, the top secret WS-117L project set up by the Air Force in 1955 
comprised three distinct military satellite efforts: a reconnaissance satellite with a 
recoverable capsule (CORONA), a missile defense early warning satellite (MIDAS), and 
an electro-optical reconnaissance satellite (SAMOS) that had been previously identified 
as SENTRY. In January 1958, President Eisenhower assigned the highest national 
priority to Project CORONA, while pursuant to NSC Action 1956, the launch of any 
satellite with reconnaissance capabilities would require Presidential signature. WS-117L 
received more funds than any other space program.182 On February 2, 1958, the 
Department of Defense established the Advanced Research Project Agency (ARPA) that 
took charge of the development of military space programs. ARPA produced its first 
progress report on March 31, 1958, estimating the first test launch of a reconnaissance 
satellite to take place in late 1958.183 The first test launch of a satellite developed by 
ARPA eventually took place in early 1959. 
Meanwhile, at an NSC meeting in February 1958, Eisenhower tasked the 
President’s Science Advisory Committee (PSAC) to produce a report on U.S. objectives 
with respect to space exploration and science.184 The PSAC team headed by Edward 
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Purcell produced the report within a month. On March 6, Purcell briefed the NSC 
outlining recommendations of his study. While the report primarily focused on the 
scientific applications of U.S. space program, Purcell concluded his briefing by 
highlighting several important military applications of space exploration, including 
“communications, reconnaissance (optical, radio, infrared), and early warning.”185 
Although the so-called Purcell Report pointed out certain military utilities of satellites, it 
concluded that in the near future, “the earth would appear to be after all, the best weapon 
carrier.” The report was approved by President Eisenhower on March 26, 1958.186 
In July, the NSC met to discuss the forthcoming NSC 5814/1, preliminary U.S. 
Policy in Outer Space. After a briefing on the draft paper, the NSC engaged in a lengthy 
discussion of the most controversial paragraph concerning the pursuit of U.S. military 
superiority in outer space vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. In the end, the Council agreed to 
refrain from such an objective and concluded that the primary goal of U.S. space policy 
should be aimed at developing and exploiting outer space capabilities “needed to achieve 
U.S. scientific, military, and political purposes.” On August 18, 1958, President approved 
NSC 5814/1 that included the aforementioned statement and also other important 
objectives of U.S. space program, including “assisting in ‘opening up’ the Soviet Bloc 
through improved intelligence.”187 
By the end of 1958, CORONA became separated from WS-117L and renamed 
Project Discoverer. The satellites were planned to be launched atop a modified Thor 
IRBM produced by the Douglas Aircraft Company, while the second stage would be 
                                                          
185 NSC Meeting Notes. 357th Meeting of NSC. March 4, 1958. 
186 Stares, B. Paul. The Militarization of Space: U.S. Policy, 1945-1984. Cornell University Press, 1985, 
pp.47-51. 
187 NSC Meeting Notes. 371st Meeting of NSC. July 3, 1958. 
70 
 
manufactured by the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation.188 While the optical reconnaissance 
program received top priority by Eisenhower, NSC 5814/1 also counted on other military 
space programs being developed by ARPA, including a satellite project that would carry 
infrared sensors to detect ballistic missiles in their launch phase. The Missile Defense 
Alert System (MIDAS) was designed as a large satellite weighing over two tons that 
would carry instrumentation to measure infrared background and identify infrared 
sources.189 The other satellite system developed by ARPA, using a more advanced 
transmission system similar to that advocated by the Project FEED BACK study in 1954, 
was the Satellite and Missile Observation System (SAMOS). SAMOS represented the 
most ambitious satellite project among all original WS-117L systems.190 Although ARPA 
experienced some delays in attempting to launch the first Discoverer satellite, on 
February 28, 1959, the United States successfully launched the first Discoverer in polar 
orbit. Discoverer 1 represented the “first man-made object ever put into a polar orbit,” 
although it did not yet carry a camera.191 During 1959, the Air Force continued with a 
series of Discoverer launches, almost none of them proved successful. It eventually took 
14 failed attempts to successfully launch a Discoverer and recover a film capsule that was 
ejected by the spacecraft in outer space and caught in midair by a C-119 airplane on 
August 19, 1960.192 Discoverer 13 became the first U.S. reconnaissance satellite. It also 
marked another record of the Discoverer series as the recovered film capsule became the 
first-ever successfully recovered object from orbit.193  
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In December 1960, President Eisenhower approved NSC 6021, a policy on 
missiles and the military space program, which for the first time featured a provision on 
Anti-Satellite (ASAT) weapons. The policy stated that “any test which involves 
destroying a satellite or space vehicle shall not proceed without specific Presidential 
approval.194 After the Soviet launch of Sputnik, all of the U.S. military services had come 
up with different ASAT proposals.195 The most significant test of an ASAT system 
codenamed BOLD ORION was conducted by the U.S. Air Force in October 1959, when 
a guided missile launched from a B-47 bomber passed nearby the Explorer VI satellite in 
LEO. Had the missile been equipped with a nuclear warhead, the satellite would have 
certainly been destroyed.196 While the Soviets were the first to establish the principle of 
the freedom of space, the United States had a green light to proceed with its satellite 
reconnaissance program. Similarly to the U-2 project, Corona was managed jointly by the 
Air Force and the CIA. In 1960, Eisenhower established the highly classified National 
Reconnaissance Office (NRO) that took over the responsibilities of the Air Force’s Office 
of Missile and Satellite Systems and became the nation’s primary agency tasked with the 
development and operation of U.S. reconnaissance satellites. 
 During Eisenhower’s presidency, 19 Corona launches took place all together, out 
of which only three resulted in a successful recovery of the film capsule.197 The two other 
projects of the original WS117L concept, MIDAS and SAMOS, also materialized under 
the Eisenhower administration. With regard to MIDAS, several alternatives for 
establishing an effective early warning capability existed. One variant, proposed by the 
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Lockheed Aircraft Corporation and studied by the PSAC in early 1959, called for an 
airborne heat detection system using modified U-2 aircraft. The PSAC report stated that 
while the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) would be able to detect 
ballistic missiles in their mid-course phase, the U-2 infrared warning system presented a 
feasible option for detecting missiles in their boost phase. The plan called for 50-100 U-2 
aircraft stationed in the Arctic that would have the capability to fly in neutral airspace and 
detect ballistic missiles prior to burnout up to about 1,100 miles. As a result, the U-2s 
operating from Greenland and Alaska at an altitude of 65,000 feet would cover the 
northern two-thirds of the Soviet Union.198 Furthermore, the PSAC also concluded that 
the ionospheric propagation detection technique appeared increasingly promising, as it 
was already providing very convincing results, and recommended that research in this 
field continue. Interestingly, the PSAC study found the MIDAS project to be the least 
viable option and concluded that insufficient evidence concerning the effectiveness of 
MIDAS should result in the deferral of its operational implementation for at least one 
year.199 In spite of the PSAC’s recommendations, President Eisenhower gave a go-ahead 
signal to the Air Force to launch the first MIDAS satellite only 11 months after the 
PSAC’s report was completed. In 1960, two MIDAS satellite launches took place from 
Cape Canaveral in Florida. While the first launch failed, the second one successfully 
placed MIDAS 2 in LEO. After one month in orbit, the satellite transmitted useful 
infrared radiation data to a U.S. ground station that contributed to the research in space-
based detection of ballistic missiles in their boost phase.200  
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SAMOS turned out to be the least matured project, partly due to advanced data 
transmission technologies that were not yet proven. In October 1960, only two months 
before President Kennedy assumed office, SAMOS 1 was launched from Vandenberg Air 
Force Base, but the second stage of the booster failed. By 1962, SAMOS eventually 
managed to radio relay images to ground stations, although only at a very poor quality. 
SAMOS thus represented a satellite that among WS-117L projects most closely 
resembled the spacecraft envisioned by the RAND’s Project FEED BACK study issued 
in 1954. After the end of the Eisenhower presidency, SAMOS eventually developed to 
contain two different payloads, one for ELINT purposes and the other for IMINT 
missions.201 Ironically, the United States was not the first nation to develop a satellite that 
could radio relay images from space back to earth. In 1959, the Soviet Union launched 
Luna 3, a satellite that for the first time radio relayed low quality pictures of the far side 
of the Moon back to a Soviet ground station.202 
The Air Force, however, was not the only branch of U.S. armed forces that 
sponsored a military space program. While ARPA continued to work on the WS-117L 
project in 1958, President Eisenhower approved Project TATTLETALE, a secret satellite 
project initiated by the Navy. The NRL set to work on a small intelligence satellite 
publicly known as the Galactic Radiation and Background (GRAB). Although GRAB 
carried scientific instrumentation to measure solar radiation, named SOLRAD, it also 
hosted a highly classified payload. The secret payload contained a special radar detector 
capable of ELINT collection. The first GRAB satellite was successfully launched from 
Cape Canaveral, Florida on June 22, 1960. Its classified sensor was activated on July 5 
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after the receipt of Presidential approval.203 The GRAB satellite not only represented the 
world’s first operational intelligence satellite, but also the first dual satellite package.204 
Overflying the Soviet Union, the GRAB satellite series eventually produced valuable 
intelligence on Soviet air defenses. While the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) shared 
the intelligence collected by GRAB with NSA as well as SAC, U.S. military commanders 
were eventually able to use the knowledge about the location of Soviet air defense and 
refine the Single Integrated Operating Plan (SIOP) for a potential nuclear strike.205 
By the early 1960s, Soviet accusations of U.S. military objectives in space 
continued to intensify. The downing of the U-2 aircraft over the Soviet Union on May 1, 
1960 greatly exacerbated U.S.-Soviet relations. Whereas Khrushchev demanded a public 
apology from President Eisenhower at the Four-Power summit in Paris, the President 
stated that the overflights of the Soviet Union had been suspended, but refused to 
apologize.206 The summit ended immediately and the U.S.-Soviet relations reached their 
nadir. While the Soviets continued to insist on banning “military” uses of space, in 
December 1961, the United States along with its allies managed to pass the UN 
Resolution 1721 (XVI) that approved of space exploration activities aimed at the 
betterment of mankind. The resolution also stated that the legal provisions of the UN 
Charter, including Article 51, extended to outer space and celestial bodies.207 Meanwhile, 
the Soviet Union launched its own “military space program” launching its first 
reconnaissance satellite, Cosmos IV, in 1962. The space race gradually shifted into a 
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higher gear. After the Soviet Union scored success in both launching the first satellite as 
well as placing the first man into space in 1957 and 1961 respectively, President Kennedy 
announced that the United States would launch a manned mission to the Moon. In 1969, 
U.S. astronauts for the first time set foot on the Moon.  In the same year, the Strategic 
Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) between the United States and the Soviet Union 
commenced. For the first time, during SALT negotiations, both countries implicitly 
acknowledged and legitimized their satellite reconnaissance capabilities by agreeing to 
use National Technical Means (NTM) for verification purposes. By 1972, military and 
intelligence applications of satellites orbiting around the Earth had been ultimately 
accepted. 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
 The Eisenhower administration successfully ushered the United States into an era 
of space exploration. Although losing the first space race, President Eisenhower gave the 
United States its first space-based intelligence capability. By the end of the Eisenhower 
presidency, the Cold War was in full swing. U.S.-Soviet relations reached a low point 
especially after the Soviets eventually managed to shoot down the U-2 aircraft on May 1, 
1960 and after Eisenhower refused to apologize as Khrushchev had demanded. The air 
and space indeed became important domains in which President Eisenhower had to show 
mastery in balancing risks and embracing opportunities. 
 Since the very beginning, the U.S. and Soviet space programs differed markedly.  
While the United States lacked effective mechanisms to acquire credible intelligence on 
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the Soviet Union, the Soviets had free access to information about the geographical 
location of U.S. military bases and nuclear facilities. Therefore, from the early stages, 
U.S. space policy included a provision for intelligence and military applications of 
satellites. In contrast, early Soviet space policy focused primarily on scientific research as 
well as manned space travel. The Soviets did not start actively working on their military 
space program until the U.S. had already acquired a space-based intelligence capability. 
Most likely, the Soviets could have matched U.S. intelligence and military space 
endeavors had they decided to do so. After all, while the United States continued to test 
the recoverable capsule of the Corona satellite in 1959, the Soviet scientific satellite Luna 
3 was already taking and radio relaying low quality pictures of the far side of the Moon. 
 Yet U.S. space efforts did not comprise only reconnaissance satellites. MIDAS 
and SAMOS certainly had military applications of strategic importance. In addition, the 
United States successfully tested a potential ASAT system. While President Eisenhower 
certainly considered threats and opportunities when deciding to proceed with U.S. space 
endeavors that might have destabilized the strategic balance between the United States 
and the Soviet Union, the question whether to develop satellites with intelligence and 
military applications as such was never truly debated at the NSC. It became clear early on 
that the imminent intelligence requirement outweighed the risk of deterioration in the 
U.S.-Soviet relations. Nevertheless, Eisenhower made sure that the launch of an 
intelligence satellite or the destruction of a satellite required Presidential approval.  
While the Soviets accused the United States of pursuing an aggressive military 
policy in space, the Eisenhower administration insisted that U.S. space efforts were of a 
peaceful nature. Indeed, it was the United States that first initiated a dialogue on space 
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arms control in early 1957. It is important to note, however, that even though President 
Eisenhower insisted on peaceful uses of outer space, from the very beginning of the U.S. 
space debate, the term “peaceful” did not preclude satellites from having “certain military 
applications.” The Soviets, on the other hand, tied the prospect of space arms control to 
other military issues, including ballistic missiles and nuclear disarmament, which turned 
out as unacceptable to the United States. The debate on establishing an international code 
of conduct in outer space soon reached an impasse. After the Soviet boycott of the UN 
Ad Hoc COPUOS in 1958, the UN General Assembly established a standing COPUOS. 
Nevertheless, the standing COPUOS met with both the United States and the Soviet 
Union present only in 1961, when outer space had already been militarized. Meanwhile, 
the U.S. delegation to the UN presented a convincing argument that the UN Charter 
already provided the legal framework for a code of conduct in outer space. The 
delegation further stated that under Article 51 of the UN Charter, nations have an 
inherent right to self-defense, and such a right was not restricted to the terrestrial arena. 
Eventually, during the Kennedy administration, COPUOS adopted Resolution 1721 
(XVI) stating that international law, including the UN Charter, extended to outer space 
and celestial bodies. 
In conclusion, the militarization of space could hardly have been avoided. While 
the Soviet Union did not choose the same path as the United States when formulating its 
space policy objectives, they carefully calculated risks and opportunities when pursuing 
space arms control negotiations with the United States. Above all, the Soviets feared 
prospective inspections of their space launch vehicles, which also comprised their 
existing ICBM force. Inspections of the R-7 rocket would have provided U.S. scientists 
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and military commanders with significant information, including the considerable 
limitations of the missile for large-scale military deployment. Furthermore, after the 
Soviet leadership decided to tie space arms control to military issues ranging from 
nuclear disarmament to the elimination of military bases on foreign territories, the space 
arms control debate virtually ended. The United States would have never given up on 
nuclear weapons that formed an indispensable pillar of U.S. security strategy, nor would 
the United States have withdrawn its armed forces from foreign territories, which 
represented an integral part of the policy of containment. After the end of the Eisenhower 
presidency, the United States and the Soviet Union eventually found a middle ground and 
the UN COPUOS gradually became an important platform for space arms control. Little 
could Eisenhower have known when approving NSC 5520 in 1955 that reconnaissance 
satellites would eventually pave the way for strategic arms control agreements and help 
usher the United States and the Soviet Union into an era of détente.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
79 
 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
ABMA  Army Ballistic Missile Agency  
AEA  Atomic Energy Agency 
ARPA  Advanced Research Project Agency  
ASAT Anti-Satellite  
BMEWS  Ballistic Missile Early Warning System  
CIA  Central Intelligence Agency  
COPUOS  Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space 
CSAGI  Special Committee for the IGY  
DCI  Director of Central Intelligence  
DEW  Distant Early Warning  
ELINT  Electronic Intelligence  
ERP  European Recovery Program  
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation  
GRAB Galactic Radiation and Background 
IMINT  Imagery Intelligence  
IAEA  International Atomic Energy Agency  
ICBM  Intercontinental Ballistic Missile  
IGY  International Geophysical Year  
JCS  Joint Chiefs of Staff  
LEO Low Earth Orbit  
MAD  Mutually Assured Destruction  
MIDAS  Missile Defense Alarm System  
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization  
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NRO  National Reconnaissance Office 
NRL Naval Research Laboratory 
NSA  National Security Agency  
NSC  National Security Council  
NSF  National Science Foundation  
NTM National Technical Means  
ONI Office of Naval Intelligence 
OSI  Office of Scientific Intelligence  
OSS  Office of Strategic Services  
PSAC President’s Science Advisory Committee 
SACEUR  Supreme Allied Commander, Europe  
SALT  Strategic Arms Limitation Talks  
SAMOS  Satellite and Missile Observation System  
SIGINT  Signals Intelligence  
SIOP Single Integrated Operating Plan 
SLV  Space Launch Vehicle  
SNIE  Special National Intelligence Estimate  
TCP  Technological Capabilities Panel  
TV  Test Vehicle  
UN  United Nations  
UNSC  United Nations Security Council  
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